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NOTICE AND THE NEW DEAL 
MILA SOHONI† 
ABSTRACT 
  The New Deal Supreme Court revised a well-known set of 
constitutional doctrines. Legal scholarship has principally focused on 
the changes that occurred in three areas—federalism, delegation, and 
economic liberty. This Article identifies a new and important fourth 
element of New Deal constitutionalism: a change in the constitutional 
doctrine of due process notice, the doctrine that specifies the 
minimum standards for constitutionally adequate notice of the law. 
The law of due process notice—which includes the doctrines of 
vagueness, retroactivity, and the rule of lenity—evolved dramatically 
over the course of the New Deal to permit lesser clarity and to tolerate 
more retroactivity. The upshot has been the near-total elimination of 
successful notice-based challenges other than in the limited context of 
First Amendment vagueness attacks. 
  Unlike the more famous doctrinal changes of this period, changes 
to due process notice doctrine were not obviously necessary to 
accommodate the New Deal legislative agenda, either as a matter of 
jurisprudence or as a matter of politics. Due process notice doctrine 
nonetheless underwent a radical transformation in this era, as the 
Court came to regard its broader shift toward deferring to legislative 
and executive policy decisions as requiring the relaxation of due 
process notice doctrine. The link forged between deference and notice 
had significant functional effects on the most important audience for 
the Court’s notice jurisprudence—Congress. By loosening the 
strictures of due process notice doctrine, the Court lowered sharply 
the enactment costs of federal legislation and thereby facilitated its 
proliferation. This is a distinct, and hitherto unacknowledged, 
mechanism by which the Court in this period enhanced national 
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power and encouraged the flourishing of the emerging administrative 
state. 
  Like much of the New Deal “settlement,” the New Deal 
reformulation of due process notice doctrine is today the subject of 
ferment in the courts. Recognizing the New Deal roots of due process 
notice doctrine is critical for understanding these ongoing judicial 
debates—and for beginning the conceptual work of mapping the 
future shape of this vital cluster of doctrines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is an oft-told tale. In the latter half of the 1930s, with the 
country in the grip of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court 
reversed course on three constitutional issues of vital significance to 
President Roosevelt’s legislative agenda for economic recovery. The 
Court abandoned the doctrine of liberty of contract,1 it approved 
congressional delegations to federal regulatory agencies,2 and it 
embraced an expansive view of Congress’s legislative powers under 
 
 1. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937). 
 2. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (“Until 1935, this Court never 
struck down a challenged statute on delegation grounds. After invalidating in 1935 two statutes 
as excessive delegations, we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate 
power under broad standards.” (citations omitted)). 
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Article I.3 By thus reformulating the rights of individuals, of the 
federal government, and of the states, New Deal constitutionalism 
upended the existing architecture of American government and laid 
the groundwork for the subsequent flourishing of the administrative 
state.4 
On the list of doctrinal changes that make up New Deal 
constitutionalism, the most famous entries are the revisions to the 
doctrines of economic due process, delegation, and federalism.5 A 
longer version of the list espoused by some scholars also includes the 
New Deal Court’s emerging solicitude for civil and political rights,6 its 
approval of augmented presidential powers over foreign affairs,7 and 
its shifting treatment of common-law sources.8 But another significant 
change that also occurred in this period has gone unremarked by 
courts and commentators: a transformation in the constitutional law 
of due process notice. 
 
 3. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (“The power of Congress over 
interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.’” (quoting Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824))); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 
36–37 (1937) (“The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power 
to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its ‘protection and advancement’ . . . .” (quoting The 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870))). 
 4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 247, 253 (1996) (calling the New Deal a “substantial reformation of the original 
constitutional structure above all because it refashioned the three basic cornerstones of that 
structure: federalism, checks and balances, and individual rights”).  
 5. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 64 (1991) (“After Roosevelt’s court-packing threat, the Supreme 
Court retreated from its former role as the guardian of economic liberty. Economic regulations 
were given a very strong presumption of validity . . . .”); id. at 73–74 (“Before the New Deal, the 
commerce clause was given a relatively narrow reading. . . . Since 1937, the scope of 
congressional power under the commerce clause has steadily expanded.”); id. at 78–79 (“In its 
abortive attack on the New Deal, one of the instruments used by the Court was the delegation 
doctrine. . . . The Court quickly retreated from the rigidity of the 1935 cases.”); G. EDWARD 
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 3 (2000) (describing the “standard areas” of 
New Deal constitutionalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 421–22, 425 (1987) (discussing “three aspects of New Deal 
constitutionalism: the rejection of the original constitutional commitment to checks and 
balances in favor of independent and insulated regulatory administration, the recognition of 
substantive entitlements beyond those protected at common law, and the abandonment of 
principles of federalism that vested regulatory authority in both the federal government and the 
state”).  
 6. Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, in 3 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LAW IN AMERICA 268, 309 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).  
 7. Id. at 283. 
 8. WHITE, supra note 5, at 3.  
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Due process notice doctrine addresses a simple, core question: 
What degree of notice of the law is constitutionally required? This 
issue has recently received attention in the context of vagueness 
challenges and in immigration cases addressing the retroactive effects 
of legislative amendments.9 All areas of law, however, rest upon the 
predicate assumption that some constitutionally adequate notice 
exists.10 The doctrine is the constitutional expression of the Anglo-
American view that secret law is the essence of tyranny.11 
This Article takes as its vantage point the doctrine of due process 
notice and recounts the story of New Deal constitutional change from 
this vantage point. Adopting this perspective brings into view several 
important and linked doctrinal developments that have, until now, 
remained either obscure or unconnected. Vagueness doctrine, 
retroactivity, and the key methods of statutory interpretation that 
relate to due process notice all changed during this period,12 and they 
all changed in the same way: to permit less clarity and predictability 
in the law. 
 
 9. See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483–84 (2012); Skilling v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2896, 2925 (2010). 
 10. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A fundamental 
principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice 
of conduct that is forbidden or required. . . . This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential 
to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 11. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964) (explaining that a secret law does 
“not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a 
legal system at all”). Jeremy Bentham, who not coincidentally invented the word “codification,” 
supplied a famous exposition of this concept: “[W]e have never heard of any tyrant in such sort 
cruel, as to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders which he had kept them from the 
knowledge of.” 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, Justice and Codification Petitions, in THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 437, 547 (John Bowring ed., 1962); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 
91, 96 (1945) (referring to “the practice of Caligula who ‘published the law, but it was written in 
a very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it’” (quoting 
SUETONIUS, LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 278 (121))); Kenneth C. Davis, The Information 
Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 779, 797 (1967) (calling secret law “an 
abomination” and “forbidden”). 
 12. “[T]he New Deal was not an altogether sudden break; it should instead be understood 
as the culmination of a set of ideas with much earlier foundations.” Sunstein, supra note 5, at 
422 n.1. The full flowering of many of these ideas only occurred in the 1940s. See WHITE, supra 
note 5, at 165 (noting that “contemporaries in the 1940s remarked on the unusual magnitude of 
changes that were taking place” in Commerce Clause, due process, Contracts Clause, and 
separation-of-powers doctrines). Accordingly, this Article treats the New Deal era as 
encompassing the period between the early 1930s and the mid-1940s. This approach typifies 
much scholarship on New Deal constitutional change, both by historians and by legal scholars. 
See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 5, at 199; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 438. 
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Interestingly—and perhaps surprisingly, considering the wealth 
of scholarship on the era—this insight is novel.13 Consider one much-
discussed aspect of constitutional due process notice doctrine: the 
doctrine of vagueness. In prominent accounts of New Deal 
constitutionalism, vagueness doctrine makes little or no appearance.14 
Conversely, scholars writing about vagueness do not give prominence 
to how the doctrine evolved in the New Deal era.15 Yet it was in the 
New Deal era that key elements of modern vagueness doctrine were 
developed. 
Three important aspects of the modern law of vagueness were 
settled during the New Deal period. First, the Court tightened its 
standards for sustaining facial vagueness challenges to laws outside 
the First Amendment context.16 Second, it started to treat civil 
economic laws as categorically subject to relaxed scrutiny for 
vagueness.17 Third, with respect to criminal laws, the Court adopted 
the practice of treating mens rea requirements as a substitute for 
clarity in legislative language.18 
Viewed separately or in combination, these principles worked a 
considerable change in the substance and procedure of vagueness 
challenges. But the notice jurisprudence of this period did more than 
merely transform vagueness. The Court changed its treatment of the 
rules pertaining to retroactivity, another doctrine that serves values of 
 
 13. Cf. Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 
CALIF. L. REV. 491, 502–03 (1994). Professor Post’s article examines how one pre-New Deal 
vagueness decision revealed the Supreme Court’s political proclivities at the time—in his 
characteristically vivid phrase, “the subterranean paths through which the ideological 
perspective that dominated the Court during the 1920s exercised its influence.” Id. at 502. Put in 
these terms, the aim of this Article is to show how the New Deal Supreme Court dug up and 
repaved those “subterranean paths” as its ideological perspective altered over the span of the 
New Deal. 
 14. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 5; Cushman, supra note 6; Sunstein, supra note 5.  
 15. See, e.g., Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003); Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: 
Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
255, 268 (2010). The chief exception is the seminal fifty-year-old student note by Professor 
Anthony Amsterdam. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in 
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). Professor Amsterdam supported his view of 
the role of the vagueness doctrine as “chiefly an instrument of buffer-zone protection” by citing 
“the very pattern of incidence of the void-for-vagueness cases, first in the sphere of economics 
at a time when economics was the sphere where the Court rode tightest rein on legislative 
innovation, and today in the now most critical field of free expression.” Id. at 84–85.  
 16. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 17. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 18. See infra Part II.A.3.  
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fair warning and notice.19 Shifts of comparable heft occurred in the 
Court’s application of the rule of lenity, a canon of statutory 
construction that likewise implicates notice.20 In sum, while it 
famously used one aspect of vagueness doctrine to build a “buffer 
zone” of protection around the exercise of certain individual 
liberties,21 the Court in this era also—less famously but no less 
critically—used the bulk of due process notice doctrine to create a 
“buffer zone” that would shield the exercise of government power 
from challenge by regulated individuals. 
This reformulation of due process notice jurisprudence presents 
a puzzle. If the legislative agenda of the New Deal was going to go 
forward, certain changes in constitutional doctrine were inevitable. 
There had to be increased national power under the Commerce 
Clause. There had to be a generous understanding of congressional 
power to delegate. There had to be an erosion of constitutional 
protections for liberty of contract. In contrast, changes to due process 
notice doctrine have no self-evident connection to the fulfillment of 
the New Deal’s institutional program. 
Why, then, did due process notice doctrine change in this period? 
The timing of these doctrinal changes was not a coincidence. The 
Court’s opinions reveal that the Justices debated how due process 
notice doctrine should be altered and ultimately came to embrace the 
view that a relaxed due process notice was a necessary component of 
the Court’s larger project of establishing judicial deference to the 
political branches on matters of economic and social policy. 
The forging of this link between notice and deference had 
notable consequences. By relaxing the constraints of due process 
notice doctrine, the Court sharply lowered the costs of enacting 
federal legislation and thus facilitated its proliferation. By thus 
boosting Congress’s lawmaking capacity, the Court’s reformulation of 
due process notice doctrine helped to pour the foundation upon 
which its coequal branches would build the modern regulatory state. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the main 
features of due process notice doctrine. Part II recounts how the 
 
 19. See infra Part II.B.  
 20. See infra Part II.C.  
 21. See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 75 (“The primary thesis advanced here is that the 
doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost 
invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of 
several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.”).  
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Court altered central aspects of this doctrine during the New Deal in 
a manner that permitted less clarity in legislative language and 
became more tolerant of retroactive changes in legislative language. 
Part III sets out opinions that reflect the Court’s rationale for these 
changes and then discusses the functional effects of the Court’s 
reformulation of due process notice doctrine on the enactment costs 
of federal legislation. Part IV explains that the New Deal 
reformulation of due process notice, like much of the New Deal 
“settlement,” is today under pressure. In several noteworthy recent 
opinions, and in both criminal and civil contexts, the Supreme Court 
has rejoined battles over the bounds of notice doctrine fought during 
the New Deal. Interestingly, many of these opinions share a common 
feature: they concern confusing federal statutes and complex federal 
regulatory schemes, and the judicial demand for better notice appears 
to flow from the perception that statutory and regulatory complexity 
poses a threat to the values of notice. As these new considerations of 
legal complexity draw modern judges to reassess the protections 
necessary to secure adequate notice, the buffer zone of deference 
erected during the New Deal is showing signs of fragility. For the 
second time in a century, due process notice is in play as a tool for 
restraining the scope and reach of federal law. 
I.  THE FACETS OF DUE PROCESS NOTICE DOCTRINE 
The most familiar aspect of the modern conception of due 
process notice is vagueness doctrine. To quote the conventional 
formulation of this rule, vagueness doctrine “bars enforcement of ‘a 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application.’”22 “Vagueness doctrine is an 
outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”23 and it thus applies to all laws, not 
merely those affecting expressive activity.24 
Vague laws imperil two important values. First, vague laws are 
hard to follow and threaten to trap the innocent: “[B]ecause we 
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, 
we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
 
 22. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).  
 23. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).  
 24. Id.  
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reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly.”25 Second, vague laws permit arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement: “A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on 
an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application.”26  
Application of modern vagueness doctrine depends in four 
important ways upon the nature of the enactment, whether statutory 
or regulatory, under attack for vagueness. First, “economic regulation 
is subject to a less strict vagueness test” than noneconomic 
regulation.27 Second, enactments with civil penalties are subject to a 
less exacting test for precision than enactments carrying criminal 
penalties.28 Third, a scienter requirement may “mitigate a law’s 
vagueness” because such a requirement might provide some 
assurance of “the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his 
conduct is proscribed.”29 Finally, “perhaps the most important factor” 
affecting the vagueness analysis is the question whether the law 
“threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 
If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of 
association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”30 
Apart from vagueness doctrine, the due process entitlement to 
“fair warning” and to an opportunity to comply with the law has other 
 
 25. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 26. Id. at 108–09. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), elevated this concern to “perhaps 
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine,” more meaningful than the value of 
notice, id. at 574; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (“Although the 
doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized 
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the 
other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 574)). 
 27. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982). 
This is because the “subject matter” of economic regulation “is often more narrow,” because 
“businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to 
consult relevant legislation in advance of action,” and because “regulated enterprise may have 
the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an 
administrative process.” Id. at 498; see also Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 
U.S. 35, 48–49 (1966) (explaining that the statute was not vague in part because “the appellants 
will have access to the Authority for a ruling to clarify the issue”), abrogated on other grounds 
by Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989). 
 28. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99. 
 29. Id. at 499. 
 30. Id. 
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“manifestations” as well.31 Chief among them are the rule of lenity 
and the rules pertaining to retroactivity in the law. In the criminal 
context, the rule of lenity, which is “a sort of ‘junior version of the 
vagueness doctrine,’” resolves ambiguity in a criminal statute so that 
the statute will apply “only to conduct clearly covered.”32 The 
conventional formulation of the rule of lenity is the maxim that 
“penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government.”33 
By encouraging precision in the drafting of criminal statutes, this rule 
protects the criminal defendant’s right to receive sufficient notice that 
she might be breaking the law.34 
Limitations on the retroactive application of laws also protect the 
values of notice and fair warning that underlie constitutional due 
process notice. If a rule is applied retroactively, the targets of the rule 
will be subjected to a legal regime that they could not have 
anticipated. Retroactive application of a new rule thus has the 
potential to cause unfair surprise, thereby threatening the value of 
fairness that due process notice doctrine seeks to serve.35 Animosity 
to retroactivity is “deeply rooted” in American law and “embodies a 
legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic”: the notion that 
“[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals 
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform 
their conduct accordingly.”36 
The rules on retroactivity apply differently in the criminal and 
the civil contexts. The constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws 
 
 31. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (identifying “three related 
manifestations of the fair warning requirement”: vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the 
prohibition against retroactive application of statutes, including the rule that prohibits “applying 
a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior 
judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope”).  
 32. Id. (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 95 
(1968)). 
 33. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59:3, at 125 (6th 
ed. 2001). 
 34. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (“[A] fair warning should 
be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law 
intends to do if a certain line is passed.”). The fit between the rule and the value of notice may 
only be a partial one. Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2425 (2006) 
(arguing that “fair notice is at most a partial justification for the rule of lenity”). 
 35. See Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the 
Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 527–28 (1987) (“Prospectivity is an 
essential requirement of the rule of law because only prospective laws allow citizens to plan 
their conduct so as to conform to the law.”).  
 36. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). 
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bars legislatures from retroactively criminalizing conduct.37 As a 
matter of due process, courts are likewise barred from applying “a 
novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the 
statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within 
its scope.”38 
In the civil context, in contrast, no per se barrier exists to the 
retroactive application of statutes as such; the mere fact of 
retroactivity is not enough to require invalidation of a statute.39 
Courts do, however, interpret statutes in accordance with a 
presumption against retroactivity, which is in effect a clear-statement 
rule requiring Congress to state unambiguously when it wishes a 
statute to “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a 
party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed.”40 If the language meets this clear-
statement test, the Court will then consider whether the legislation 
has an impermissibly retroactive effect as a matter of substantive due 
process.41 This inquiry can turn on a variety of factors, including 
whether the law affects procedural or substantive rights, whether it 
appears punitive, and whether it creates new liabilities where none 
 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88, 95 (1871) 
(“There can be no legal conviction, nor any valid judgment pronounced upon conviction, unless 
the law creating the offence be at the time in existence.”). 
 38. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); see also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1964) (“If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from 
passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process 
Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. The fundamental 
principle that ‘the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred’ 
must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from 
legislatures.” (citations omitted) (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 58–59 (2d ed. 1960))).  
 39. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267 (“[T]he potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation 
is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope.”).  
 40. Id. at 280 (“When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court 
must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would 
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or 
impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate 
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear 
congressional intent favoring such a result.”); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 
211, 237 (1995) (“[T]he traditional rule, confirmed only last Term, [is] that statutes do not apply 
retroactively unless Congress expressly states that they do.”). 
 41. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (noting that the judgment as to whether a 
statute acts retroactively “should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair 
notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations” (quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 
358 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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previously existed,42 but the overarching inquiry focuses on 
“considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled 
expectations.”43 
This (perhaps dry) mapping of the black-letter components of 
modern due process notice doctrine should not obscure the 
overarching and common significance of these rules. Supreme Court 
precedent protects the values of notice and fair warning both through 
substantive doctrines and through canons of construction and in both 
the civil and criminal contexts. Although these doctrines are not 
generally spoken of as a cluster, they are deeply interconnected. Part 
of the project of this Article is to show the links between these 
doctrines and how they move in concert. The next Part explains how 
the Court reshaped the chief contours of these doctrines over the 
span of the New Deal. 
II.  THE NEW DEAL REFORMULATION OF DUE PROCESS NOTICE 
DOCTRINE 
Concerns about due process notice would have loomed much 
larger at the beginning of the New Deal than they do today. In the 
early 1930s, the possibility of secret law was not merely hypothetical. 
One of the capstone achievements of President Roosevelt’s first New 
Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)44 resulted in the 
production of law at a rate that made it no mean feat merely to find 
applicable positive law. Hundreds of codes prohibiting thousands of 
practices were approved by the National Recovery Administration 
(NRA), the agency responsible for implementing the NIRA.45 There 
 
 42. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 282–83. 
 43. Id. at 270. 
 44. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (terminated by Exec. 
Order No. 7252 (Dec. 21, 1935), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006)).  
 45. See GARY DEAN BEST, PRIDE, PREJUDICE, AND POLITICS: ROOSEVELT VERSUS 
RECOVERY, 1933–1938, at 79 (1991) (noting that “between 4,000 and 5,000 business practices 
were prohibited,” roughly 3,000 administrative orders spanning over 10,000 pages were 
promulgated, and “innumerable opinions and directions from national, regional, and code 
boards” interpreted and enforced the NIRA’s directives (quoting Raymond Clapper, Between 
You and Me: Business Men To Protest NRA Arbitrary Legal System When Congress Meets, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1934, at 2) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Erwin N. Griswold, 
Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 
HARV. L. REV. 198, 199 (1934) (“In the first year of the National Recovery Administration, 
2998 administrative orders were issued. In addition to these, the Recovery Administration has 
adopted numerous regulations and sets of regulations which are to be found scattered among 
5991 press releases during this period. It has been estimated that the total amount of ‘law’ 
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was not yet a Federal Register to collect and disseminate such 
pronouncements.46 The NRA “boasted” that it “would not be bound 
by ‘legalisms’” or “legalistic requirements” in its lawmaking.47 But the 
practical effect of the NRA’s stance was that it “dispense[d] with one 
of the most basic elements of a fair legal system: notice through 
published laws.”48 
An explicit example of the New Deal Court’s concerns about 
notice appears in a case that is famous for an entirely different 
reason: because it is one of just two instances in which the Supreme 
Court has struck down a statute as an unconstitutional delegation of 
power to the executive branch. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan49 
addressed a section of the NIRA that prohibited transportation in 
commerce of oil produced or withdrawn in excess of state laws or 
regulations.50 The portion of the Petroleum Code limiting oil 
production had been rescinded by executive order.51 But because of a 
“failure to give appropriate public notice of the change in the 
section,” this rescission was, for all intents and purposes, unknown 
even to “the persons affected, the prosecuting authorities, and the 
courts.”52 Lurking in the backdrop of the Court’s invalidation of the 
challenged section of the NIRA as an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power53 was the Court’s jarring recognition that the vast 
executive power created by the NIRA could be wielded secretly—in a 
manner unbeknownst to litigants as sophisticated as those practicing 
before the nation’s highest court. Even Justice Cardozo, though he 
would have upheld the NIRA’s delegation of authority, wrote that 
 
evolved during the first year of the NRA’s activities exceeds 10,000 pages, probably a greater 
volume than the total amount of statute law contained in the United States Code.”). 
 46. See Griswold, supra note 45, at 198–99, 203–05. 
 47. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative Law, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1126–28 (1997). 
 48. Id. at 1127. 
 49. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  
 50. Id. at 405–06.  
 51. Id. at 412 (“The controversy with respect to the provision of § 4 of Article III of the 
Petroleum Code was initiated and proceeded in the courts below upon a false assumption. That 
assumption was that this section still contained the paragraph (eliminated by the Executive 
Order [6199] of Sept. 13, 1933) by which production in excess of assigned quotas was made an 
unfair practice and a violation of the Code.”). See also PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL 
LAWYERS 70–71 (1982). 
 52. Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 412.  
 53. See id. at 415 (“[Section 9(c)] gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine 
the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And 
disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.”). 
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“[o]ne must deplore the administrative methods that brought about 
uncertainty for a time as to the terms of executive orders intended to 
be law.”54 
Today, it is unthinkable that parties could litigate a case up to the 
Supreme Court without knowing whether or not the provisions they 
were arguing over still existed. But for the Court during the 1930s, the 
absence of notice of the law was a tangible possibility, not merely 
conjectural. Moreover, and this is perhaps the more important point, 
the lapse in notice of the law came to the Court wrapped in a 
challenge to the heart of the first New Deal agenda, with its 
centralized planning, its industrial codes of law, and its innovative 
administrative methods. 
With this context in mind, the discussion below analyzes how the 
Court’s stance on due process notice changed as the New Deal era 
unfolded. 
A. Vagueness 
The years between 1914 and 1932 saw the birth of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, which is to say, the transformation of vagueness 
doctrine from a canon of statutory construction into a substantive 
doctrine for invalidating statutes.55 By Connally v. General 
Construction Co.,56 in which it coined the still-current verbal 
formulation of the doctrine,57 the Court had struck down criminal 
statutes as vague on several occasions.58 By 1931, the requirement of 
definiteness in statutory standards had “rapidly crystallized into an 
imposing doctrine of constitutional law.”59 The Court during this 
period held that statutory standards for “‘unreasonable prices,’ 
 
 54. Id. at 434 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 55. See Lockwood, supra note 15, at 268 (“Although it is not easy to pinpoint the genesis of 
the void for vagueness doctrine, at some point near the decision in Nash [v. United States, 229 
U.S. 373 (1914)], a law’s vagueness was seen as violating the right of due process. This 
determination allowed the United States Supreme Court to invalidate vague federal or state 
enactments in a variety of disciplines as unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)).  
 56. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).  
 57. See id. at 391 (“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”). 
 58. Note, Indefinite Criteria of Definiteness in Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 160, 160–61 
(1931). 
 59. Id. at 160. 
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‘reasonable profits,’ ‘real value’ and ‘current rate of wages’” were 
unconstitutionally vague.60 
Considerations of vagueness formed a component or a backstop 
to many of the pre-New Deal Court’s most notorious holdings. The 
most obvious examples are the nondelegation cases.61 Both landmark 
nondelegation decisions from this era—A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States62 and Panama Refining—faulted the vagueness 
of the statutes under attack.63 But vagueness also played a part in 
other important cases from this period with less evident connections 
to legislative clarity. The famous Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,64 in 
which the Court invalidated minimum-wage laws in Washington, 
D.C.,65 was not just a case about liberty of contract, but a case about 
vagueness as well.66 Likewise, Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,67 
 
 60. Id. at 162–63 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 
U.S. 81, 84 (1921); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927) passim; Int’l Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914) passim; and Connally, 269 U.S. 385 passim); see also, e.g., 
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 
567 (1931); Connally, 269 U.S. at 393–94; A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 
238–42 (1925). 
 61. Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 320 (2000) (noting that 
the nondelegation doctrine is “closely connected to the void for vagueness doctrine, requiring 
that certain laws be clear rather than open-ended”). 
 62. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 63. Id. at 530–31 (“As to the ‘codes of fair competition,’ . . . the question is more 
fundamental. It is whether there is any adequate definition of the subject to which the codes are 
to be addressed. What is meant by ‘fair competition’ as the term is used in the act? . . . [I]s it 
used as a convenient designation for whatever set of laws the formulators of a code for a 
particular trade or industry may propose and the President may approve (subject to certain 
restrictions), or the President may himself prescribe, as being wise and beneficient 
provisions . . . ?” (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act § 3, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196 
(1933))); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418 (1935) (“[The law] speaks, parenthetically, 
of a possible temporary restriction of production, but of what, or in what circumstances, it gives 
no suggestion. The section also speaks in general terms of the conservation of natural resources, 
but it prescribes no policy for the achievement of that end. It is manifest that this broad outline 
is simply an introduction of the Act, leaving the legislative policy as to particular subjects to be 
declared and defined, if at all, by the subsequent sections.”). The Court’s holdings in these cases, 
by the way, were not inevitable. Some theories of improper delegation do not turn on the clarity 
of the instructions given by Congress. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that where “a pure delegation of legislative power” exists, it 
becomes “irrelevant whether the standards are adequate, because they are not standards related 
to the exercise of executive or judicial powers” but instead “are, plainly and simply, standards 
for further legislation”). 
 64. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).  
 65. Id. at 561. 
 66. See id. at 555 (“The standard furnished by the statute for the guidance of the board is 
so vague as to be impossible of practical application with any reasonable degree of accuracy. 
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which is more generally thought of as a liberty-of-contract case, held 
that the New York minimum-wage statute for women workers was 
unconstitutionally vague.68 
After the New Deal, the Court showed much less concern with 
vagueness. The Court rejected vagueness challenges to a variety of 
statutes, both civil and criminal.69 These holdings were occasionally 
joined with cases about federalism or liberty of contract. So, for 
example, when the Court famously rejected federalism challenges to 
 
What is sufficient to supply the necessary cost of living for a woman worker and maintain her in 
good health and protect her morals is obviously not a precise or unvarying sum—not even 
approximately so.”); see also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 614 (1936) 
(noting that “an additional ground of subordinate consequence” in Adkins was its “ruling that 
defects in the prescribed standard stamped that Act as arbitrary and invalid”). 
 67. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).  
 68. Id. at 608 (“The act of Congress had one standard, the living wage; this State act has 
added another, reasonable value. The minimum wage must include both. What was vague 
before has not been made any clearer.” (quoting People ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead, 200 N.E. 
799, 801 (N.Y. 1936)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 69. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579–80 
(1973) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53. Stat. 1147 (1939) 
(amended), which prohibited federal employees from taking an active part in political 
management or in political campaigns); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 119 (1967) (rejecting a 
vagueness attack to a statute making an alien who was homosexual subject to deportation for 
“sexual affliction”); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 48–49 (1966) 
(rejecting a vagueness attack to a state alcohol-control statute), abrogated on other grounds by 
Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 
U.S. 29, 33 (1963) (holding that the Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 52 Stat. 1526 (1936), gave 
sufficient warning that selling below cost for the purpose of destroying competition is unlawful); 
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 443, 448 (1954) (holding that a New York statute 
authorizing disciplinary action against physicians was not unconstitutionally vague); Boyce 
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) (noting that the scienter 
requirement of knowledge or willful neglect in a federal regulation did “much to destroy any 
force in the argument that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held 
invalid”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding that the phrase “crime 
involving moral turpitude” does not render a deportation statute unconstitutional for vagueness 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 385–86, 412–
13 (1950) (rejecting a vagueness attack on a federal statute that conditioned recognition of a 
labor organization on affidavits by its officers that they do not belong to the Communist Party); 
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 5–8 (1947) (rejecting a vagueness attack on a federal statute 
that criminalized featherbedding); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523–24 (1942) 
(rejecting a vagueness attack on a provision of federal income tax law); Neblett v. Carpenter, 
305 U.S. 297, 303 (1938) (holding that certain provisions of the California Insurance Code, ch. 
145, 1935 Cal. Stat. 496, are not so vague that “no one can determine what powers are intended 
to be conferred upon the Commissioner”); see also Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 74 n.38 
(“Since the advent of the New Deal Court, . . . there has been one economic vagueness 
case . . . .”).  
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the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)70 in United States v. 
Darby,71 it also rejected the defendant’s vagueness challenge to the 
provision of the act that criminalized the transportation in commerce 
of goods that had been produced in violation of the act.72 And the 
newly loosened standards for clarity had important effects on cases 
addressing legislative delegations of authority to executive agencies 
because the Court was no longer inclined to void such delegations for 
impermissible vagueness.73 
The Court’s treatment of First Amendment vagueness attacks 
evolved in the opposite fashion. In the pre-New Deal period, the 
Court did not favorably regard vagueness challenges on First 
Amendment grounds; vagueness challenges “received short shrift” in 
free speech cases.74 In contrast, First Amendment vagueness 
challenges began to gain traction by the late 1930s, and thereafter 
developed into a formidable edifice of law.75 
Several distinct doctrinal shifts account for these tectonic 
changes in vagueness cases. First, the Court tightened its standards 
for sustaining facial attacks to the vagueness of laws. Second, the 
Court altered its pre-New Deal methods for determining the 
substantive vagueness of civil economic statutes. Third, the Court 
insulated criminal laws from vagueness attacks by starting to treat 
mens rea requirements as a substitute for legislative clarity. 
 
 70. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 71. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 72. Id. at 125–26 (“One who employs persons, without conforming to the prescribed wage 
and hour conditions, to work on goods which he ships or expects to ship across state lines, is 
warned that he may be subject to the criminal penalties of the Act. No more is required.”). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939) (“In dealing with 
legislation involving questions of economic adjustment, each enactment must be considered to 
determine whether it states the purpose which the Congress seeks to accomplish and the 
standards by which that purpose is to be worked out with sufficient exactness to enable those 
affected to understand these limits. Within these tests the Congress needs specify only so far as 
is reasonably practicable.”).  
 74. Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 74 n.38; see also, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 
277 (1915) (upholding the constitutionality of a law criminalizing the editing of printed matter 
advocating disrespect for the law); Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 247 (1915) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a law creating a board of censors for motion pictures).  
 75. See generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Niemotko v. 
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 
444 (1938); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); see also Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 74 
n.38 (noting the proliferation of First Amendment vagueness cases in the post-New Deal era).  
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1. Facial Challenges.  Before the New Deal and into the early 
New Deal period, the Court entertained and sustained numerous 
facial attacks to the vagueness of statutes, both civil and criminal, 
without establishing first whether the statute gave fair warning to the 
particular complainant before the Court.76 As late as 1939, the Court 
in Lanzetta v. New Jersey77 insisted that it was proper to rule on a 
facial attack to a New Jersey criminal statute that made it illegal for 
persons with a record of prior convictions and without a lawful 
occupation to consort in a “gang.”78 The Court’s opinion made no 
reference to whether the challengers themselves had adequate notice 
that their conduct was prohibited.79 The Court in this period took it 
“for granted that [facial] invalidation of a statute for vagueness was 
not precluded by a showing that the claimant or others had been 
fairly warned.”80 This was for a simple reason: “The certainty required 
by the Due Process Clause is not tested from the would-be violator’s 
standpoint; the test is rather whether adequate guidance is given to 
those who would be law-abiding.”81 
 
 76. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 242–43 (1932) (holding facially 
invalid a provision for the receivership of oil property in the case of an oil operator’s violation 
of an act prohibiting waste on the ground that “it appears upon a mere inspection that these 
general words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their 
violation constitutes a denial of due process of law”); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 565 (1931) 
(“[A]ppellant has been held liable to the penalties of the Act for his disobedience to it as it 
stood when it was enacted. He was entitled at that time to assert his constitutional right by 
virtue of the invalidity of the statute upon its face.”); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 
(1927) (holding facially invalid a Colorado antitrust law because of its vagueness); Connally v. 
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926) (holding facially invalid an Oklahoma statute 
regulating wages and hours because of its vagueness); A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 
267 U.S. 233, 238–42 (1925) (holding facially invalid a statute prohibiting the exaction of 
unreasonable prices for necessaries because of its vagueness); United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (holding facially invalid section 4 of the Lever Act, ch. 53, 
40 Stat. 276 (1917) (amended), because of its vagueness); see also Int’l Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223–24 (1914) (reversing convictions under vague Kentucky antitrust 
legislation using a rationale amounting to facial invalidation).  
 77. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
 78. Id. at 452–53; see also id. at 453 (“If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to 
the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not 
serve to validate it. It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to 
govern conduct and warns against transgression.” (citations omitted)).  
 79. See id.  
 80. Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1289, 1295 (1999). Although odd exceptions to this practice existed, “the 
opinions in these cases show no awareness of departure from the general practice.” Id. at 1295–
96.  
 81. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 458 (1953) (Clark, J., 
dissenting).  
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In 1940, the Court created First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine in Thornhill v. Alabama,82 which expressly singled out First 
Amendment cases as being a special context in which facial attacks 
were endorsed.83 Perhaps not coincidentally, the Court thereafter 
began to inquire into whether a statute was vague as applied to the 
challenger as a prerequisite to addressing a facial vagueness attack on 
a statute that did not implicate the First Amendment. 
This shift was gradual, not absolute. In Robinson v. United 
States,84 for example, the Court rejected a facial attack on a federal 
criminal kidnapping statute by citing the fact that the particular 
conduct charged against the defendant unquestionably came within 
the statutory proscription.85 Two years later, however, in United States 
v. Petrillo,86 the Court considered and rejected a facial attack on an 
economic criminal statute without considering whether the particular 
defendant charged had received adequate notice that his conduct was 
criminal.87 In Williams v. United States,88 the Court reverted to the 
Robinson approach and rejected a facial attack on a federal statute 
that prohibited extracting confessions by force because it was “plain 
as a pikestaff” that the confessions at issue were inadmissible 
evidence.89 In United States v. Harriss,90 which concerned the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act,91 the Court rejected a facial vagueness 
attack on the statute without first determining whether the 
defendants’ conduct was unambiguously prohibited by it.92 
 
 82. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
 83. Id. at 98. 
 84. Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945).  
 85. See id. at 286 (“[W]e cannot doubt that a kidnapper who violently struck the head of his 
victim with an iron bar, as evidence showed that this petitioner did, comes within the group 
Congress had in mind. This purpose to authorize a death penalty is clear even though Congress 
did not unmistakably mark some boundary between a pin prick and a permanently mutilated 
body. It is for Congress and not for us to decide whether it is wise public policy to inflict the 
death penalty at all.”). 
 86. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 87. See id. at 5–6, 12 (“[T]he motion to dismiss on the ground of vagueness and 
indefiniteness squarely raises the question of whether the section invoked in the indictment is 
void in toto, barring all further actions under it, in this, and every other case.”). 
 88. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951). 
 89. Id. at 101. 
 90. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
 91. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, ch. 753, tit. III, 60 Stat. 839 (1946) (repealed 
1995). 
 92. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 627.  
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And so it went. The Court’s vacillating approach, however, hides 
an underlying consistency. In the above cases, the Court entertained 
facial attacks to the vagueness of nonspeech statutes. But Lanzetta 
appears to be the last case to expressly endorse and actually sustain a 
facial vagueness attack outside the First Amendment context without 
any inquiry into whether the law was vague as applied to the 
challenger.93 
In 1963, the Court in United States v. National Dairy Products 
Corp.94 made it explicit: in nonspeech cases, the challenger had to 
show that the law was vague as applied to her before she could 
prevail on a facial challenge.95 Put another way, the Court’s treatment 
of facial challenges to the vagueness of nonspeech statutes would 
thereafter merge with its treatment of any facial challenge to a 
nonspeech statute.96 At this point, “non-speech overbreadth” for 
vagueness cases was formally interred, even though it had been 
 
 93. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). For a discussion of the Court’s 
rare and silent departures from this rule for statutes implicating other preferred constitutional 
rights, see infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 
(1948), is not to the contrary. Evans sustained a facial attack on a statute that prohibited 
concealing and harboring aliens because of a legislative drafting error that made the penalty 
provisions of the statute incomprehensible. Id. at 495. As Professor Amsterdam notes, this was a 
case “involving a statute found so unclear as to be unenforceable, despite no want of adequate 
warning.” Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 86 n.92.  
 94. United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). 
 95. See id. at 33 (“In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be 
examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged.” (citing Robinson v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945))); id. at 36 (“[T]he approach to ‘vagueness’ governing a case 
like this is different from that followed in cases arising under the First Amendment. There we 
are concerned with the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such vagueness may in 
itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct.”); id. (“We are thus 
permitted to consider the warning provided by [the statute] not only in terms of the statute ‘on 
its face’ but also in the light of the conduct to which it is applied.”); id. at 37 (“National Dairy 
and Wise were adequately forewarned of the illegal conduct charged against them . . . .”); see 
also Hill, supra note 80, at 1295–96 (“[P]rior to 1963 it was taken for granted that invalidation of 
a statute for vagueness was not precluded by a showing that the claimant or others had been 
fairly warned. . . . United States v. National Dairy Products Corp. was the first instance of a 
considered refusal to decide the vagueness issue by facial analysis.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 96. Professor Richard Fallon has shown that the Court does not obey consistently its 
professed rule that as-applied challenges have priority over facial challenges. See Richard H. 
Fallon, Fact and Fiction About As-Applied and Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 946 
(2011) (“Although the Supreme Court sometimes says the contrary, it by no means always, or 
even typically, prefers as-applied to facial challenges . . . . To the contrary, the Court frequently 
eschews opportunities to decide cases on narrow, as-applied bases even when such bases are 
available.”). In the subcategory of cases addressing facial vagueness challenges, however, the 
Court has hewed to its announced approach except in rare circumstances involving certain 
preferred constitutional rights. See infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.  
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effectively defunct since Lanzetta. Subsequent holdings, such as those 
in Parker v. Levy97 and United States v. Mazurie,98 entrenched this 
approach, which continues to be applied in modern cases.99 In recent 
decades, the Court has sporadically departed from this practice by 
facially invalidating statutes as vague when constitutional values were 
potentially at issue,100 but these cases are hardly ringing endorsements 
of the general propriety of facial vagueness attacks.101 By thus curbing 
the availability of facial vagueness attacks outside the First 
Amendment context, the Court sharply raised the bar for bringing a 
successful vagueness challenge. 
2. Civil Economic Legislation.  Vagueness doctrine had 
traditionally treated a term’s common-law meaning or the 
conventions of its usage in a trade as sources of semantic content that 
could clarify otherwise ambiguous statutory terminology.102 Thus, 
 
 97. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
 98. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
 99. See id. at 550 (“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not 
involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at 
hand.” (citing Nat’l Dairy, 372 U.S. 29)); Parker, 417 U.S. at 756 (“One to whose conduct a 
statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Chapman v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (“First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the 
statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this 
case.” (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975))); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495–500 (1982) (“A plaintiff who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the 
conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant’s conduct before 
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. . . . Flipside’s facial challenge fails because, 
under the test appropriate to either a quasi-criminal or a criminal law, the ordinance is 
sufficiently clear as applied to Flipside.” (footnote omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges 
to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 304 (1994) (“The substantive law of 
vagueness does not require an exception to the Salerno presumption; indeed, it contains its own 
version. It is well established that a litigant whose conduct is clearly proscribed by a statute 
cannot complain that the statute would be ambiguous as applied to a third party.”). 
 100. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (involving a facial attack on a 
city ordinance criminalizing loitering); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (involving a 
facial attack on a criminal loitering statute); see also Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 310 & nn. 298–
302 (noting decisions involving vagrancy, loitering, price fixing, and abortion).  
 101. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 310 (noting that when the Court has sustained facial 
attacks to vagrancy and abortion laws, it has done so “without acknowledging it was doing so or 
discussing the propriety of such action”).  
 102. See Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 242–43 (1932) (“The general 
expressions employed here are not known to the common law or shown to have any meaning in 
the oil industry sufficiently definite to enable those familiar with the operation of oil wells to 
apply them with any reasonable degree of certainty.”); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 
385, 391 (1926) (“[I]t will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the decisions of 
the court, upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they 
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whereas the intelligibility of a generally applicable statute would be 
tested by reference to a person of “ordinary intelligence”103 or by 
reference to “well-settled” meaning,104 a statute regulating businesses 
would be assessed by reference to whether it was comprehensible to 
those engaged in the regulated trade.105 Economic laws, then, were not 
subjected to a qualitatively lesser test for vagueness; rather, they were 
subject to the generally applicable rule that a law provided adequate 
notice when it was comprehensible to those whom it regulated. 
This methodology largely disappeared after the New Deal. The 
precise moment is difficult to pinpoint. The turning point may simply 
have been the “switch in time” cases authorizing rational economic 
legislation.106 Or it may have been a byproduct or offshoot of the new 
line of First Amendment cases that emphasized with fresh vigor how 
important it was to protect speech from vague laws.107 The method 
that took its place was the rule that economic laws are subject to 
relaxed vagueness review simply because they are economic laws, just 
as they are subject to minimal review for policy purposes. In the 
decades following the New Deal, it became uncontroversial to 
announce that “purely economic regulation” was subject to a less 
stringent vagueness standard.108 
 
employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to 
enable those within their reach to correctly apply them, or a well-settled common-law 
meaning . . . .” (citations omitted)); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) 
(“Furthermore, the evidence, while conflicting, warrants the conclusion that the term ‘kosher’ 
has a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply it, at 
least as a general thing.”). 
 103. Cf. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (noting that vagueness cases often turn on judicial 
determinations of what “men of common intelligence” would comprehend). 
 104. Id. (noting the role of “a well-settled common-law meaning” in saving statutes from 
vagueness challenges). 
 105. See, e.g., supra note 102. 
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); cf. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) 
(contrasting the level of scrutiny that is applicable in categories of cases involving preferred 
liberties with the level of scrutiny that is appropriate to “regulatory legislation affecting 
ordinary commercial transactions”). 
 107. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–04 (1940) (acknowledging that “the 
rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others 
for a share in the products of industry are subject to modification or qualification in the interests 
of the society in which they exist,” but further noting that the state may not curtail “the effective 
exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern”). 
 108. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.10 (1974) (“Compare the less stringent 
requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regulation.”); 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1972) (“In the field of regulatory 
statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater 
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Separately, the New Deal Court altered its treatment of civil laws 
vis-à-vis criminal laws. Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court had 
held that civil statutes and criminal statutes were equally subject to 
void-for-vagueness analysis. The case that presented this question, 
A.B. Small v. American Sugar Refining Co.,109 involved a breach-of-
contract action over two sugar contracts.110 The petitioner contended 
that the contracts were unenforceable because they violated the 
provision of the Lever Act111 that forbade “unreasonable” profits on 
such sales.112 In response, the seller argued that an earlier criminal 
case, United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,113 required the Court to 
reject the petitioner’s defense because that case had held that the 
standard of “unreasonable” profits was an unconstitutionally vague 
standard for criminal liability.114 The Small Court agreed that the 
reasoning of Cohen governed in the civil context: 
The defendant attempts to distinguish [Cohen and its progeny] 
because they were criminal prosecutions. But that is not an adequate 
distinction. The ground or principle of the decisions was not such as 
to be applicable only to criminal prosecutions. It was not the 
criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience 
to a rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite as really to 
be no rule or standard at all.115 
The Court went on to state that legislation “declaring the 
transaction unlawful or stripping a participant of his rights under it” 
would equally fall within the rule of Cohen, and it approved the 
reasoning of several lower courts that had similarly held that civil 
 
leeway is allowed. . . . The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder are not in 
business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would 
have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them.” (citations omitted)); 
United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (“[In cases arising under the 
First Amendment] we are concerned with the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such 
vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct. No such 
factor is present . . . where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to destroy 
competition . . . .” (citations omitted)).  
 109. A.B. Small v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925). 
 110. Id. at 239. 
 111. Lever Act, ch. 53, 40 Stat. 276 (1917) (repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 
1359). 
 112. Small, 267 U.S. at 238. 
 113. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
 114. Small, 267 U.S. at 238. 
 115. Id. at 239.  
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statutes could be void for vagueness.116 Two years later, the Court 
reiterated that the principle of due process forbidding vague 
legislation “has application as well in civil as in criminal legislation.”117 
After the New Deal, the Court’s stance on this issue shifted in a 
subtle way that would ultimately prove important. The Court started 
to emphasize that criminal statutes were subject to more rigorous 
review for vagueness than civil statutes. The Court stated that “[t]he 
standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than 
in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement.”118 
By 1951, the differential treatment was entrenched still more deeply. 
In Jordan v. De George,119 the Court strongly implied that noncriminal 
statutes were presumptively exempt from vagueness attack when it 
stated that it was only entertaining a vagueness challenge to the civil 
immigration statute because of the “grave nature” of deportation.120 
Indeed, the Court in Jordan went on to state that the “essential 
purpose of the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine is to warn individuals of 
the criminal consequences of their conduct.”121 The distinction for the 
purposes of vagueness analysis between civil and criminal laws was 
subsequently reiterated on several occasions,122 and the modern rule 
continues to reflect this analytical divide.123 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 463 (1927). Other vagueness challenges to civil 
statutes during the same era were not successful, but the Court never rested its rejection of 
these challenges upon the civil nature of the legislation under attack. See, e.g., Old Dearborn 
Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 196 (1936) (“[T]he phrases complained of 
are sufficiently definite, considering the whole statute . . . .”); Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Groeger, 
266 U.S. 521, 523–24 (1925) (“[The language in question] is as definite and certain as is the 
common law rule; and to hold that the duty imposed cannot be ascertained would be as 
unreasonable as it would be to declare that the common law rule . . . is too indefinite to be 
enforced or complied with.”); Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426, 434 (1915) (“Rules of conduct must 
necessarily be expressed in general terms and depend for their application upon the 
circumstances, and circumstances vary.”). 
 118. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). 
 119. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
 120. Id. at 230–31 (“It should be emphasized that this statute does not declare certain 
conduct to be criminal. Its function is to apprise aliens of the consequences which follow after 
conviction and sentence of the requisite two crimes. Despite the fact that this is not a criminal 
statute, we shall nevertheless examine the application of the vagueness doctrine to this case. We 
do this in view of the grave nature of deportation.”). 
 121. Id. at 230 (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951)). 
 122. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (“It is true that this Court has held the 
‘void for vagueness’ doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions. However, this is 
where ‘the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard . . . was so vague and indefinite as really 
to be no rule or standard at all . . . .’” (last alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925))); Barenblatt v. United States, 
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This shift in the verbal articulation of the formula may seem a 
slight one—a mere change in emphasis, or perhaps a statement of an 
unobjectionable or obvious fact in a system of laws that frequently, 
and without much ado, treats civil and criminal laws quite differently. 
But insofar as vagueness doctrine was concerned, the Court’s 
emphasis on the civil-criminal divide appears to have had more than 
slight consequences. Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has not 
struck down a federal civil statute regulating economic behavior as 
void for vagueness.124 On more than one occasion, it has reversed 
decisions by lower federal courts that have struck federal civil statutes 
as vague.125 State or local civil statutes that have been held void for 
vagueness have implicated First Amendment values.126 Conversely, 
vagueness challenges have retained some potency when levied against 
criminal statutes, usually state or local,127 but occasionally federal.128 
 
360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“It goes without saying that a law to be valid 
must be clear enough to make its commands understandable. For obvious reasons, the standard 
of certainty required in criminal statutes is more exacting than in noncriminal statutes.”). 
 123. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 
(1982) (“The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than 
criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”).  
 124. See Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV. 
1543, 1543 (1981) (“[Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980),] marks 
the first time since 1925 [Small] that a federal court has declared [a federal civil statute] to be 
void for vagueness.”). In Big Mama Rag, the D.C. Circuit held a Treasury regulation’s definition 
of the term “educational” to be unconstitutionally vague in violation of the First Amendment. 
Id. at 1032. When, on rare occasions, lower courts have held that federal statutes are vague, the 
Supreme Court has rebuffed them. See infra note 125.  
 125. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974) (“[T]he standard of ‘cause’ set 
forth in the Lloyd-La Follette Act[, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970),] as a limitation on the Government’s 
authority to discharge federal employees is constitutionally sufficient against the charges both of 
overbreadth and of vagueness.”); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 
U.S. 548, 568 (1973) (sustaining over vagueness and overbreadth challenges the Hatch Act’s 
prohibition against federal employees taking an active part in political management or in 
political campaigns). 
 126. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 611, 622–23 (1976) (invalidating a local 
ordinance “regulat[ing] most forms of door-to-door canvassing and solicitation”); Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 593–94, 604 (1967) (invalidating New York statutory provisions 
that made treasonable or seditious words or acts a ground for removal from the public school 
system or state employment); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 361, 379–80 (1964) (invalidating 
Washington statutes requiring loyalty oaths as a condition of employment for teachers and state 
employees); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 425–26, 428–29 (1963) (invalidating a Virginia 
statutory provision that restricted the practice of advising prospective litigants to seek particular 
attorneys); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497, 504–06 (1952) (invalidating a New 
York statutory provision concerning licensing of motion pictures). 
 127. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974) (invalidating a state statute 
prohibiting “flag-misuse”); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) 
(invalidating a city vagrancy ordinance); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615–16 
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Although the Court continued to describe its stance as one of 
“greater tolerance” to vagueness in civil economic statutes than in 
criminal statutes,129 this understates the case. The doctrine of due 
process notice fell into such desuetude in the civil economic context 
that, in 1983, Justice Brennan noted with evident surprise that the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “apparently believed that, in 
cases not involving criminal sanctions, formal administrative 
rulemakings, or activities protected by the First Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause imposes virtually no requirement of fair warning.”130 
In short, judicial enforcement of minimal standards for linguistic 
clarity for civil economic legislation evaporated after the New Deal. 
3. Criminal Legislation.  Although criminal legislation remained 
subject to scrutiny for vagueness, the vulnerability of criminal 
legislation to vagueness attack diminished during the New Deal. The 
reason for this was that the Court settled upon a novel doctrinal tool 
for deflecting vagueness challenges to criminal statutes: the principle 
that a mens rea element in a criminal statute could mitigate a lack of 
clarity in its language. 
Before the New Deal, the Court had used statutory mens rea 
elements in a different fashion—as a means to protect the interests of 
accused defendants in having notice of complex laws. In 1933, in 
United States v. Murdock,131 the Court held that in the criminal tax 
context, the term “willfully” meant an “evil motive”;132 only the errors 
of the “purposeful tax violator” would meet the standard of 
 
(1971) (invalidating a city loitering ordinance); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966) 
(invalidating a statute that allowed a jury to “impose costs upon a defendant who has been 
found by the jury to be not guilty of a crime charged against him”); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 
U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (invalidating a state antigang statute).  
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). For one explanation why 
the Court might adopt a different approach to federal and state statutes, see Amsterdam, supra 
note 15, at 83 n.80, 86–87 & nn.92–97. 
 129. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). 
 130. Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 969 (1983) (Brennan, J.) (dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). Justice Brennan went on to state that the Court had “frequently entertained claims 
that regulations of economic and professional activity are unconstitutionally vague, even when 
the law at issue depends on civil enforcement and has no apparent effect on First Amendment 
rights.” Id. at 970 (emphasis added). This characterization is somewhat loose; the post-New 
Deal cases he cites may have “entertained” such challenges, but none actually sustained them.  
 131. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).  
 132. Id. at 396 (“Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide 
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the 
adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to 
measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct.”).  
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willfulness.133 The special Murdock construction of willfulness in the 
tax context is an “exception to the traditional rule” that ignorance of 
the law is no excuse, and it applies “largely due to the complexity of 
the tax laws.”134 In other words, within the isolated context of federal 
criminal tax laws, the Court treated a statutory willfulness term as 
tightening the standard for criminal culpability by reading such a term 
as requiring the government to prove a knowing violation of the tax 
law by the accused.135 
After the New Deal, however, the jurisprudence of mens rea 
took an interesting tack in the context of vagueness challenges. The 
Court began to rely on mens rea terms—initially willfulness terms, 
but eventually other intent terms too—as a reason to rebut or deflect 
vagueness attacks on criminal statutes. 
This was a curious turn. Logically speaking, mens rea and clarity 
are apples and oranges, or nonfungible goods. The presence of a 
mens rea requirement in a criminal statute cannot make otherwise 
unclear statutory language clear as to what it prohibits. But after 
rebuffing—or, more accurately, ignoring—the possibility of equating 
mens rea with clarity in several cases,136 the Court eventually seized 
upon this method for quelling vagueness attacks. 
On three occasions between 1936 and 1942, the Court cited a 
statute’s scienter requirement as its basis for rejecting a vagueness 
 
 133. Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable 
Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 366 (1998) (quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 134. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991); Davies, supra note 133, at 363, 366 
(“In a long line of cases beginning in 1933 with United States v. Murdock, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly rejected arguments by the government that the maxim should preclude violators of 
the federal tax code from claiming that their ignorance or misunderstanding of the tax 
provisions excused their violations. . . . Throughout the tax decisions that followed Murdock, the 
Court repeatedly stressed the complexity of the tax code as the basis for its construction of the 
willfulness term.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 135. The Murdock line survived the New Deal intact and continues to be applied in modern 
cases. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1998); Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200. This rule 
has also been applied to antistructuring. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 
(1994). 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (striking down a 
Lever Act provision as vague without discussing the willfulness term). Mens rea was also noted, 
though in dicta, in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1925), and 
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918). In both of these cases, the Court found the 
challenged laws specific enough to be comprehensible to the individuals regulated even apart 
from the fact that only knowing violations were punished. Hygrade Provision Co., 266 U.S. at 
502; Omaechevarria, 246 U.S. at 348. 
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attack.137 But the battle over this question was really only decisively 
joined in Screws v. United States.138 As part of a New Deal initiative, 
President Roosevelt sought to invoke the criminal provisions of 
federal civil rights statutes to provide a federal response to the 
lynching of African Americans by white supremacists.139 The statutes 
criminalized the deprivation of constitutional rights by officials acting 
under color of legal authority.140 In one of the four separate opinions 
that would ultimately dispose of the case, the plurality recounted the 
“shocking and revolting” circumstances whereby an African 
American, Robert Hall, was brutally murdered by a Georgia sheriff 
who had a vendetta against him.141 The sheriff, Screws, was alleged to 
have been acting under color of Georgia law to willfully deprive Hall 
of his rights to life, liberty, and due process of law and for conspiring 
to do the same.142 
Upon conviction, the defendant appealed on vagueness grounds. 
He contended that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because 
the standard of due process incorporated by the statute created “no 
ascertainable standard of guilt.”143 As the plurality put it, the 
challenged act “would incorporate by reference a large body of 
changing and uncertain law. That law is not always reducible to 
specific rules, is expressible only in general terms, and turns many 
times on the facts of a particular case.”144 The defendant argued that 
“such a body of legal principles lacks the basic specificity necessary 
for criminal statutes under our system of government.”145 
While acknowledging the gravity of the vagueness attack, the 
plurality rejected this argument by citing the element of willfulness in 
 
 137. See United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to 
a tax evasion statute in part because of a willfulness provision and stating that “[a] mind intent 
upon willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence”); Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 
19, 27–28 (1941) (rejecting a vagueness challenge in part because of the statute’s scienter 
element, which required “intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be 
used to the injury of the United States”); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 247 
(1936) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a Federal Communications Commission order 
because the act only punished knowing and willful padding of charges).  
 138. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101–02 (1945) (plurality opinion).  
 139. See John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 473–74 
(2001).  
 140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 (2006).  
 141. Screws, 325 U.S. at 92 (plurality opinion). 
 142. Id. at 92–93.  
 143. Id. at 95.  
 144. Id. at 96. 
 145. Id.  
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the statute. The plurality reasoned that “willfully” as used in the 
challenged act “connot[ed] a purpose to deprive a person of a specific 
constitutional right.”146 On that reading, “[a]n evil motive to 
accomplish that which the statute condemns becomes a constituent 
element of the crime,” an element that had to be submitted to a 
jury.147 And because the willful intent described by the law meant only 
the intent to deprive a person of “a right which has been made 
specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States or by decisions interpreting them,” the law was not 
indefinite.148 
The dissent thought this reasoning was ludicrous, and said so: 
  It is as novel as it is an inadmissible principle that a criminal 
statute of indefinite scope can be rendered definite by requiring that 
a person “willfully” commit what Congress has not defined but 
which, if Congress had defined, could constitutionally be 
outlawed. . . . It has not been explained how all the considerations of 
unconstitutional vagueness which are laid bare in the early part of 
the Court’s opinion evaporate by suggesting that what is otherwise 
too vaguely defined must be “willfully” committed.149 
The dissenting Justices remarked that the plurality’s reasoning 
“amount[ed] to saying that the black heart of the defendant” could 
enable him to know what deprivations of constitutional rights were 
forbidden, “although we as judges are not able to define their classes 
or their limits.”150 
Notwithstanding the odd combination of opinions that produced 
the outcome in Screws, the rule was thereafter settled.151 In American 
Communications Ass’n v. Douds,152 the Court addressed the provision 
 
 146. Id. at 101.  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 104–05 (“Of course, willful conduct cannot make definite that which is undefined. 
But willful violators of constitutional requirements, which have been defined, certainly are in no 
position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with 
punishment. When they act willfully in the sense in which we use the word, they act in open 
defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific 
and definite.”).  
 149. Id. at 153 (Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 151. 
 151. See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 87 n.98 (noting that “‘scienter’ has become a 
recognized element of the lore of vagueness”).  
 152. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
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of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947153 that, as a condition 
of recognition of a labor union, required officers of the union to file 
affidavits stating that they did not belong to the Communist Party and 
did not believe in the overthrow of the government by force.154 The 
Court held that because criminal punishment under this provision 
would require proof of willfulness, the statute was not vague,155 
despite the “breadth of such [statutory] terms as ‘affiliated,’ ‘supports’ 
and ‘illegal or unconstitutional methods.’”156 The Court would 
thereafter frequently cite a statute’s mens rea requirement as a factor 
in its decision to reject a vagueness challenge to it.157 
Interestingly, the evolution of the Court’s treatment of the mens 
rea requirement echoes the evolution of its stance toward as-applied 
 
 153. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 154. Douds, 339 U.S. at 385–86.  
 155. Id. at 413 (“[S]ince the constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice 
to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair 
warning, the fact that punishment is restricted to acts done with knowledge that they contravene 
the statute makes this objection [of vagueness] untenable.”). 
 156. Id. at 412. The statute at issue, section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 
1947, provided as follows:  
No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board of any 
question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a 
labor organization . . . unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit . . . by each 
officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international 
labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a 
member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not 
believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or 
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or 
unconstitutional methods.  
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 9(h), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. III 1950) (repealed 
1959).  
 157. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 35 (1963) (observing 
that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibited making sales “at unreasonably low prices for the 
purpose of destroying competition” and stating that this “additional element of predatory intent 
alleged in the indictment and required by the Act provides further definition of the prohibited 
conduct” (emphasis added)); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) 
(“The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of 
the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any 
force in the argument that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held 
invalid.”); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (“It would strain the requirement for 
certainty in criminal law standards too near the breaking point to say that it was impossible 
judicially to determine whether a person knew when he was willfully attempting to compel 
another to hire unneeded employees.”); cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) 
(invalidating a state abortion-control statute as vague in part because of “the absence of a 
scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is 
or may be viable”). 
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and facial vagueness challenges described above.158 The Court’s 
ultimate position is that a requirement that the defendant willfully, 
knowingly, or purposefully contravene the statute—a mens rea 
requirement—can save the whole statute from vagueness. This 
means, in essence, that a facial attack upon the vagueness of a 
criminal statute cannot succeed if a conviction under the statute 
requires some proof of culpable intent by the defendant. This 
approach resonates with the Court’s post-New Deal adoption of the 
rule that as-applied vagueness must be shown before a facial attack 
on vagueness can prevail.159 By thus relying upon scienter 
requirements as a substitute for statutory clarity, the Supreme Court 
lowered the constitutional threshold of clarity for the mine run of 
criminal laws.160 
B. Retroactivity 
Derived from the English common law and ultimately from 
Roman law,161 the antiretroactivity principle was adopted into 
American law in the young days of the republic.162 In the early 
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court expanded the rule by 
applying it to law whose prospective operation had the effect of 
divesting rights that were “vested” prior to the date of the law’s 
enactment.163 Thus expanded and entrenched, the concept of 
retroactivity and the related notion of vested rights “played a central 
role in the constitutional protection of property and contract rights 
 
 158. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 159. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 160. Professor Amsterdam puts the point sharply:  
Yet it is evident that, unless the Court has been fooling itself in these cases, the 
“scienter” meant must be some other kind of scienter than that traditionally known to 
the common law—the knowing performance of an act with intent to bring about that 
thing, whatever it is, which the statute proscribes, knowledge of the fact that it is so 
proscribed being immaterial. Such scienter would clarify nothing; a clarificatory 
“scienter” must envisage not only a knowing what is done but a knowing that what is 
done is unlawful or, at least, so “wrong” that it is probably unlawful. 
Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 87 n.98 (citation omitted).  
 161. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of 
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1936). 
 162. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801); Smead, supra 
note 161, at 780–81 & n.22 (collecting cases).  
 163. See Smead, supra note 161, at 782. In its earlier formulation, the rule “had not included 
those laws which divested rights vested antecedently to enactment in applying to cases arising 
prospectively.” Id. 
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before the late nineteenth century.”164 Through the start of the New 
Deal era, the Court continued to reiterate the presumption against 
retroactivity165 and to hold statutes impermissibly retroactive.166 
As the New Deal progressed, the Court’s stance toward 
retroactivity evolved in conjunction with its treatment of the 
Contracts Clause. In Contracts Clause jurisprudence, a critical turning 
point was Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.167 The Blaisdell 
decision approved a scheme adopted by the state of Minnesota to 
provide emergency relief to debtors by extending the period in which 
the debtors could redeem property that would otherwise be 
foreclosed on—in other words, a mortgage moratorium.168 A five-
justice majority of the Court reasoned that the Contracts Clause 
posed no bar to legislation that was reasonably drawn to further an 
appropriate legislative end: “The question is not whether the 
legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or 
indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end 
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that 
end.”169 
Blaisdell did not mark a complete reversal of course in Contracts 
Clause jurisprudence. In the two years following Blaisdell, the Court 
did strike down statutes with similar effects to the Minnesota law in 
which the challenged statutes were not tethered to the existence of 
economic emergencies.170 By 1940, however, the Court had relaxed 
 
 164. James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for 
Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 103 (1993). 
 165. See, e.g., Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930) (“Ordinarily, statutes establish 
rules for the future, and they will not be applied retrospectively unless that purpose plainly 
appears.”); United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162–63 (1928) (“Statutes are 
not to be given retroactive effect or construed to change the status of claims fixed in accordance 
with earlier provisions unless the legislative purpose so to do plainly appears.”). But it appears 
that the presumption against retroactivity was not uniformly applied. See Ann Woolhandler, 
Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1018 (2006) (citing 
two exceptions). 
 166. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935) 
(holding invalid a Kentucky statute that applied retroactively to preexisting mortgages).  
 167. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 168. Id. at 416–18, 447–48. 
 169. Id. at 438. 
 170. See Woolhandler, supra note 165, at 1050 nn.195–200; see also Cushman, supra note 6, 
at 37 (“In the twenty-five months following the announcement of the Blaisdell decision, the 
Court heard three cases involving challenges to state debtor relief legislation under the Contract 
Clause. In each case, the Court invalidated the legislation by a unanimous vote.”).  
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this limitation, holding in Veix v. 6th Ward Building & Loan Ass’n171 
that state legislation restricting sales of shares of building-and-loan 
associations was valid regardless of the existence of conditions of 
economic emergency.172 Five years later, the Court in East New York 
Savings Bank v. Hahn173 again upheld retroactive legislation 
continuing a mortgage moratorium, despite the fact that it had no link 
to conditions of economic emergency.174 In rejecting a retroactivity 
challenge to a regulation some years later, the Court admonished that 
“[i]mmunity from federal regulation is not gained through 
forehanded contracts. Were it otherwise the paramount powers of 
Congress could be nullified by ‘prophetic discernment.’”175 
The Court’s shift on Contracts Clause doctrine influenced its 
treatment of retroactivity. With the demise of Contracts Clause 
jurisprudence, challenges to a law’s substantive retroactivity came to 
be analyzed within the rubric of due process.176 Under the categorical 
approach of post-1938 due process jurisprudence, economic 
legislation will withstand due process challenge if it bears some 
rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. In this 
calculation, the retroactive effects of legislation do not constitute a 
reason for special scrutiny.177 Rather, retroactivity is merely “a factor 
 
 171. Veix v. 6th Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940).  
 172. Id. at 39 (“Many of the enactments were temporary in character. We are here 
considering a permanent piece of legislation. So far as the contract clause is concerned, is this 
significant? We think not. ‘Emergency does not create [constitutional] power, emergency may 
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. at 426)).  
 173. E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945). 
 174. See id. at 232–34 (relying upon the “governing constitutional principle” that “the 
authority of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of its people’” could not “be gainsaid by 
abstracting [a private contract] from its public context and treating it as though it were an 
isolated private contract constitutionally immune from impairment” (quoting Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
at 433)). 
 175. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947) (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 
391 (1932)).  
 176. See Kainen, supra note 164, at 111–12 (“In contrast with the nineteenth century’s 
emphasis on the vesting of rights, however, the typical modern approach considers the 
retroactive application of statutes to be no more than a factor to be weighed in deciding whether 
a particular interference with economic rights constitutes a violation of substantive due process. 
Moreover, retroactivity has virtually no independent significance as a factor of consideration.” 
(footnotes omitted)); see also DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 64 (1998). 
 177. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 1055, 1063–64 (1997) (explaining how, after the New Deal, the “erosion of the doctrine 
of substantive due process curtailed any judicial inclination to subject retroactive legislation to 
intensive scrutiny”). 
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to be weighed in deciding whether a particular interference with 
economic rights constitutes a violation of substantive due process.”178 
And it is a factor with “virtually no independent significance.”179 
Though the Court has occasionally implied that retroactive legislation 
may be harder to sustain in the face of a due process challenge than 
prospective legislation,180 it has also emphatically disclaimed that any 
such greater burden exists.181 
An additional change deserves mention. In 1940, the Court held 
that a past practice of regulation has relevance to the assessment of 
whether a new law has impermissibly retroactive effect.182 This 
principle took root over time.183 By holding that the foreseeability of 
 
 178. Kainen, supra note 164, at 111. 
 179. Id. at 111–12. 
 180. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1976) (“It does not 
follow, however, that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. 
The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of 
due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”). 
 181. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (“The ‘harsh and oppressive’ 
formulation, however, ‘does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational 
legislation’ that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy.” (quoting 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984))); Pension Benefit, 
467 U.S. at 730 (“To be sure, we went on to recognize that retroactive legislation does have to 
meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects. . . . But that burden is met 
simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a 
rational legislative purpose.”). 
 182. Veix v. 6th Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (“It was while statutory 
requirements were in effect that petitioner purchased his shares. When he purchased into an 
enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects, he purchased subject to 
further legislation upon the same topic.”). Veix provides the clearest statement of this idea, 
though earlier cases contain perceptible hints at it. See, e.g., Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 
294 U.S. 240, 307–08 (1935) (“[W]hen contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the 
control of the Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their 
transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about 
them.”).  
 183. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413 
(1983) (“The threshold determination is whether the [Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, 
1979 Kan. Sess. Laws 841 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1401 to 55-1415 (Supp. 1982)),] 
has impaired substantially [the petitioner’s] contractual rights. Significant here is the fact that 
the parties are operating in a heavily regulated industry.”); Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, 
Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) (“Congress by the [Housing Act of 1954 (1954 Act), ch. 649, 68 Stat. 
610 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.),] was doing no more than 
protecting the regulatory system which it had designed. Those who do business in the regulated 
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve 
the legislative end.”); Chrysler Corp. v. Kolosso Auto Sales, Inc., 148 F.3d 892, 895 (7th Cir. 
1998) (“The centrality of foreseeability explains the courts’ emphasis, in deciding whether the 
application of a new regulation violates the contracts clause, on the degree to which the activity 
to which the contract pertains was already heavily regulated when the contract was made.”).  
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regulation can, in essence, mitigate a law’s retroactive effects, the 
Court has authorized a kind of regulatory piggybacking whereby the 
existence of regulations with prospective effects can justify the 
adoption of regulations with retroactive effects.184 Retroactive 
legislation can thus follow most readily when prospective regulation 
can most readily be enacted—in the economic realm, where only 
rational-basis review applies.185 
The Court would subsequently tie expressly its changing stance 
on retroactive legislation to the New Deal revolution in constitutional 
jurisprudence. In a 1958 case, in “what seemed almost a 
peroration,”186 the Court rejected a retroactivity challenge on the 
grounds that finding the statute impermissibly retroactive would 
“make the ghost of Lochner v. New York walk again.”187 In Landgraf 
v. USI Film Products,188 the Court similarly noted that the 
presumption against retroactivity “had special force in the era in 
which courts tended to view legislative interference with property and 
contract rights circumspectly.”189 The cumulative upshot has been 
predictable: an unbroken record since the New Deal of sustaining 
retroactive economic laws against due process challenges.190  
 
 184. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive 
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 700 (1960) (“The justification given for this sweeping 
principle is that the parties are on notice that if the legislature has competence in a given field, it 
may well exercise its powers, and therefore there is no unfair surprise when these powers are 
exercised retroactively.”). Hochman criticizes the rule because “it in effect makes retroactivity 
immaterial in determining the constitutionality of a statute; if the legislature could act as it did 
by a statute which had prospective application only, it can make the statute apply to past 
transactions.” Id. 
 185. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (describing standards for 
rational-basis review of economic regulation). 
 186. Guido Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE 
L.J. 1191, 1194 (1962). 
 187. Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91–92 (1958) (citations omitted); see also id. (“Congress by the 
1954 Act was doing no more than protecting the regulatory system which it had designed. Those 
who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by 
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” (citation omitted)). 
 188. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).  
 189. Id. at 272. 
 190. See Andrew C. Weiler, Note, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial 
Rubberstamping of Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1071–72 (1993) 
(“Significantly, since the origination of the tax deference doctrine in 1938, the Supreme Court 
not only has never sustained a due process challenge to the retroactive application of a tax law, 
but, more remarkably, has not sustained a due process challenge to any retroactive economic 
law.” (footnotes omitted)). In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), a four-Justice 
plurality of the Court invalidated the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 
9701–9722 (1994 & Supp. II 1997), as a regulatory taking, with Justice Kennedy concurring in 
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C. The Rule of Lenity 
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction rooted in 
common-law doctrine.191 The rule “directs courts to construe statutory 
ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants.”192 One of the “classic 
rationales” for the rule is the notice theory.193 On this theory, the rule 
of lenity provides a degree of “assurance that no criminal defendants 
will be caught off guard by broader statutory interpretations than 
they could reasonably anticipate.”194 Although some commentators 
have objected that “criminals do not read statutes,”195 the principle of 
notice continues to be accepted as a chief reason for construing 
criminal statutes narrowly.196 
At the time of the New Deal, commentators were less than 
enamored of the rule of lenity.197 In 1935, one influential author wrote 
that the rule should be sharply limited.198 Another author argued that 
the rule stood in the way of reform-oriented theories of punishment 
focused on incapacitation and deterrence.199 On this view, the rule of 
lenity was one species of judicial “quibble” and “casuistry”200 designed 
 
the judgment and dissenting in part, Apfel, 524 U.S. at 503–04, 539. Justice Kennedy would have 
invalidated the statute on due process retroactivity grounds. Id. at 547–50 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
 191. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 358 
(“Although [United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820),] was the first Supreme 
Court decision to apply strict construction [of penal statutes], the rule did have a well 
established history in English law.”). 
 192. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885 
(2004). 
 193. Id. at 886.  
 194. Id. 
 195. E.g., id.  
 196. Narrowing prosecutorial discretion is another rationale sometimes advanced for the 
rule of lenity. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as 
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 600 (1992).  
 197. This view would later change. See Kahan, supra note 191, at 349 (“Lenity is almost 
universally celebrated among commentators.”). 
 198. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 
748, 762–63 (1935) (“[T]here is no sound reason for a general doctrine of strict construction of 
penal statutes, and prima facie all such should have as liberal a construction as statutes 
generally . . . .”). 
 199. See JOHN BARKER WAITE, THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ACTION 320 (1934); see also Francis 
A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American Criminal Justice: Some Latter-Day Adventures of 
the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385, 400 nn.59, 62 (1987) (citing WAITE, supra, at 
16, 320).  
 200. WAITE, supra note 199, at 320. 
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to nullify legislative intent: “[F]or a century or more it has been the 
policy of the judiciary—a policy now gradually changing—to utilize 
casuistic plausibility or any dubiety of the situation for the benefit of 
the accused rather than for the immediate safety of society.”201 
These views ultimately found their way on the Court. As 
Professor Lawrence Solan has pointed out, the arrival of Justice 
Frankfurter to the Supreme Court in 1939 changed the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the rule of lenity.202 The change occurred in an 
indirect way: by means of altering the rule of lenity’s priority as an 
interpretive principle.203 
Traditionally, the rule of lenity meant that “[c]ourts interpreted 
criminal statutes narrowly . . . , but to the extent that the dispute was 
over the meaning of a statutory word, limited investigation occurred 
into the legislature’s intended meaning of that word.”204 But Justice 
Frankfurter did not agree with the long-honored rule coined by Chief 
Justice Marshall that “probability is not a guide which a court, in 
construing a penal statute, can safely take.”205 Rather, as Professor 
Solan puts it, Justice Frankfurter was functioning within a new 
“interpretive culture” under which courts considered legislative 
history and other materials beyond the text of the statute prior to 
determining that the statute was ambiguous and that the rule of lenity 
required invocation.206 On Frankfurter’s view, “lenity was not as much 
about language as it was about residual uncertainty after careful 
 
 201. Id. at 16; see also id. at 320 (“[I]f once the whole idea of punishment be discarded and 
the objective of every prosecution be recognized as the removal of a particular social danger, 
the public attitude must inevitably change. Indeed, the adoption of the new objective will be 
possible only when that attitude does change. In the light of that purpose, quibble, casuistry, 
technicality in the fabrication of ‘rights’, will no longer seem legitimate defenses in a contest, but 
must appear in their true character as obstacles to the progress of social prophylaxis.”). 
 202. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 102–08 
(1998). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 96. 
 205. Id. at 105 (“Marshall’s position in Wiltberger that ‘probability is not a guide which a 
court, in construing a penal statute, can safely take,’ was reprehensible to Frankfurter, who had 
no interest in using lenity to thwart clear legislative intent.” (citation omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 105 (1820)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283 (1943) (condemning “the notion that 
criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial and conventional rule” (quoting United 
States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55. (1909)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 206. Solan, supra note 202, at 107. 
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study.”207 This “vision of lenity differed sharply from the traditional 
one.”208 
Thus reformulated, the rule of lenity began to lose its bite.209 In 
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,210 the Court characterized the rule 
of lenity as one of those rules of statutory construction that “come 
down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative 
process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of 
an act to its narrowest permissible compass.”211 As the Court went on 
to admonish, such rules of statutory construction were 
subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of 
an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read 
text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the 
meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular 
cases the generally expressed legislative policy.”212 
The next year, the Court noted that the rule of lenity had no 
weight when its application would cause “distortion or nullification of 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Compare, e.g., United States v. Harris, 177 U.S. 305, 309 (1900) (relying on the rule of 
lenity to reject an argument that a “company” included persons acting on that company’s behalf 
(internal quotation marks omitted)), with, e.g., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 283 (rejecting 
application of the rule of lenity and holding that a statute that imposed liability on a 
“corporation” imposed liability on that corporation’s responsible officers).  
 210. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). 
 211. Id. at 350. 
 212. Id. at 350–51. Another traditional rule of statutory construction—the rule that statutes 
in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed—was also criticized by 
contemporaneous observers as evincing judicial mistrust of legislatures. As one of these 
observers wrote, “The exemption of the time-honored common law from the requirement of 
definiteness indicates that, at bottom, the doctrine springs from a lack of confidence in the 
legislatures.” Indefinite Criteria of Definiteness in Statutes, supra note 58, at 163; see also id. at 
161–63 & nn.9, 20–23 (collecting cases). In 1936, in the heart of the legal controversies over the 
New Deal, Justice Harlan Stone criticized the strict construction rule as an “ancient shibboleth” 
that had no place in interpreting “statutes establishing administrative agencies and defining 
their powers.” Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 
(1936). The role of courts, he wrote, was to help agencies in carrying out legislative schemes, not 
to hamper them: “[T]he function which courts are called upon to perform, in carrying into 
operation such administrative schemes, is constructive, not destructive, to make administrative 
agencies, wherever reasonably possible, effective instruments for law enforcement, and not to 
destroy them.” Id. Sutherland, citing Stone, states that “[m]odern regulatory legislation” is not 
subject to the antiderogation rule and will instead “receive[] liberal construction,” because such 
legislation creates “a newly conceived system of legal arrangements to deal with emergent 
problems in society.” NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 3 SUTHERLAND ON 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61:3 (6th ed. 2007).  
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the evident meaning and purpose of the legislation.”213 Soon 
thereafter, the Court again emphasized judicial deference, holding 
that the rule of lenity could override neither “common sense” nor 
“evident statutory purpose.”214 
These pronouncements eventually matured into the “doctrinal 
formulation that has now become dominant”—that “a court may 
properly conclude that a statute is ‘ambiguous’ for purposes of lenity 
only ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’ 
including ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and 
motivating policies’ of the statute.”215 As Professor Dan Kahan has 
pointed out, however, “[r]anking lenity ‘last’ among interpretive 
conventions all but guarantees its irrelevance.”216 The New Deal era 
commenced the line of cases that would demote the rule of lenity to 
this low point on the totem pole.217 
D. Summary 
As this Part has shown, the New Deal era saw the Court 
transform the standards for due process notice doctrine in a variety of 
ways. The Court altered its practices with respect to facial vagueness 
attacks, reduced the clarity it would demand of civil economic laws, 
 
 213. United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1944) (“The appellee invokes the rule 
that criminal laws are to be strictly construed and defendants are not to be convicted under 
statutes too vague to apprise the citizen of the nature of the offense. That principle, however, 
does not require distortion or nullification of the evident meaning and purpose of the 
legislation.”). 
 214. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1948) (“The canon in favor of strict 
construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory 
purpose. It does not require magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give 
it a meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language.”). 
 215. Kahan, supra note 191, at 386 (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336, 347 (1971)); see also Marie Gryphon, The Better Part of Lenity, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
717, 720–21 (2011) (“The current majority view [among courts] might appropriately be called 
the ‘lenity last’ view. . . . ‘Lenity last’ is a seldom used, last ditch tiebreaker, invoked only when 
every other clue to the legislature’s intent has been examined without success.”). 
 216. Kahan, supra note 191, at 386; see also Allen, supra note 199, at 398 (concluding that 
“the idea of strict interpretation has suffered significant erosion in the present century”). 
 217. The current Court has tended to require a “grievous ambiguity” in the statute before 
the rule of lenity may apply. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2009) (“To 
invoke the rule [of lenity], we must conclude that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in 
the statute.” (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 (2009) (holding that 
the rule of lenity did not apply because the statute at issue was not “grievously ambiguous” 
(alterations omitted) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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and began to treat mens rea requirements as a substitute for clarity in 
the legislative language of criminal statutes. In concert with these 
changes, it altered its treatment of retroactivity and the rule of lenity. 
One curious fact about these changes is the rather sub rosa 
manner in which they have occurred, at least in comparison to other 
famous New Deal doctrinal changes. A quick-and-dirty 
demonstration of this discrepancy is easy to make. If one looks up on 
Westlaw the cases famously associated with the pre-New Deal 
doctrines—Lochner v. New York,218 Tipaldo, Adkins, Hammer v. 
Dagenhart,219 and so forth—they are for the most part “red flagged.” 
The cases from the old regime are visibly acknowledged to be no 
longer good law, because they have been overturned by their 
counterparts after the “switch in time”—NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp.,220 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,221 and so forth. In 
contrast, many important pre-New Deal cases that stated principles of 
due process notice doctrine that are now effectively defunct—for 
example, Connally and Small—are not “red flagged” in Westlaw. 
They have not been branded as “bad law.” But they have utterly 
different practical, real-world consequences from what they once had. 
When due process notice doctrine is concerned, then, the New 
Deal’s break with past practice is neither loudly proclaimed nor easily 
recognized, though it was quite as sharp. With apologies to T.S. 
Eliot,222 sometimes the law changes not with a bang, but a whisper. 
III.  THE BUFFER’S SIGNIFICANCE 
The New Deal was a multifaceted political project with a goal no 
less ambitious than the transformation of American society.223 As 
such, the New Deal necessarily implicated certain central doctrines of 
constitutional law. The New Deal could not go forward without the 
Supreme Court’s acquiescence in the federal government’s increased 
power.224 Nor could it go forward without the Court’s acquiescence in 
 
 218. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 219. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 220. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). 
 221. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).  
 222. Cf. T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in POEMS: 1909–1925, at 123, 128 (Harcourt, Brace & 
Co. 1932) (1925) (“This is the way the world ends/Not with a bang but a whimper.”).  
 223. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 254.  
 224. See id. at 253–54 (“The original understanding of a sharply constrained central 
government was therefore repudiated by the nation. . . . [S]tate autonomy seemed an obstacle to 
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a generous understanding of the boundaries of congressional 
authority to delegate to federal administrative agencies.225 Nor could 
it go forward without the Court’s acquiescence in the erosion of the 
protections for liberty of contract.226 The fact that these doctrines 
changed during the New Deal, then, is not hard to understand; these 
were all legal issues that the implementation of the New Deal, by 
necessity, staged for the Court’s resolution.227 
Against this backdrop, the changes in due process notice 
doctrine identified in the preceding discussion make a rather jarring 
appearance. In contrast to the more famous doctrinal changes that 
occurred in this period, alterations to due process notice were not 
demanded by the New Deal’s political project—at least, not in any 
straightforward sense—either as a matter of jurisprudence or as a 
matter of politics. 
Jurisprudentially, questions of due process notice operate on a 
different plane than the other elements of New Deal constitutional 
change. At the heart of due process notice doctrine sits the basic 
principle that individuals have the right to know the meaning of the 
 
democratic self-government, not a crucial part of it—especially in the midst of the Depression, 
when states were generally perceived as ineffectual entities buffeted by private factions.”). 
 225. See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 132–33 (1st ed. 1969) (explaining the need for broad delegations 
as administrative components were added to the government).  
 226. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 423 (describing the New Deal view that the common law 
accorded “excessive protection [to] established property interests and insufficient protection 
[to] the interests of the poor, the elderly, and the unemployed”). 
 227. This Article does not take a position in the spirited academic exchange on whether 
these doctrinal changes occurred purely because of the Court-packing threat or for other 
reasons. The point is only that these constitutional issues were questions presented in 
straightforward fashion by the New Deal’s political agenda. A wealth of scholarship addresses 
the empirical accuracy of the so-called “switch-in-time” narrative. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, 
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994); see also WHITE, supra note 5, at 203; 
Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 71 
(2010). These debates “center on the question whether the Supreme Court shifted ground in 
response to the direct threat to its independence embodied in the Court-packing proposal, or 
whether there is another less political explanation for the Court’s doctrinal change,” a question 
that many of the debaters themselves concede “is probably unanswerable.” Barry Friedman, 
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
971, 976 (2000). For a persuasive argument that the Court-packing plan had no durable 
consequences upon the Court’s performance as a majoritarian institution, see Richard H. Pildes, 
Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 132. According to 
Pildes, “[O]ne can read the 1937 experience as suggesting that, for better or worse, judicial 
independence and the authority of the Court have become so entrenched in America that even 
the most popular politicians play with fire if they seek too directly to take on the power of the 
Court.” Id.  
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laws that govern them.228 This is a rule-of-law value,229 a value that can 
be honored or dishonored independently of the substantive shape of a 
legal regime. Logically speaking, vigorous protection of due process 
notice is compatible with many different patterns of substantive 
policy; there is no reason why judicial deference to the substance of 
the New Deal project should have demanded judicial deference on 
the acceptable degree of linguistic clarity of civil and criminal laws 
and regulations. Judicial review of legislative specificity and 
prospectivity need not move in rigid lockstep with judicial review of 
policy. 
Politically, the link between due process notice and the New 
Deal project appears even more attenuated. Both elite and popular 
opinion at the time were riveted by the highly salient question of 
whether the New Deal’s programs would stand or fall, not by the 
secondary question of how much specificity the Court was demanding 
of legislative language, much less by the tertiary question of what 
methods of statutory construction the Court was using to determine 
the presence or absence of legislative clarity.230 The Court’s habit of 
pairing its vagueness holdings with economic liberty or delegation 
holdings no doubt helped to obscure its notice jurisprudence;231 then, 
and indeed now, readers of these opinions naturally train their fire on 
the more controversial substantive holdings rather than on the 
twinned vagueness holdings. When crowds in Ames, Iowa, hanged in 
effigy six sitting Supreme Court justices in 1936,232 their anger was 
presumably not ignited by the Court’s vagueness jurisprudence. 
What, then, drove the changes in due process notice doctrine 
that occurred in this period? Why did the Court quietly cede so much 
of the terrain over which it was previously willing to enforce 
constitutional constraints? 
 
 228. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (noting Justice Holmes’s 
description of the constitutional necessity of “fair warning . . . in language that the common 
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed” (alteration in 
original) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
 229. See FULLER, supra note 11, at 39. 
 230. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, THE POLITICS OF 
UPHEAVAL 490 (1960) (“If the New Deal legislation were all nullified, the President said 
somberly, there would be marching farmers and marching miners and marching workingmen 
throughout the land.”); Friedman, supra note 227, at 980–82 (collecting sources describing the 
“tremendous popular engagement” provoked by “the New Deal fight”).  
 231. See supra text accompanying notes 61–73. 
 232. SCHLESINGER, supra note 230, at 488.  
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The simple reason is that the Court ultimately came to the view 
that its newly emergent stance of judicial deference on matters of 
policy required deference on the facets of due process notice 
doctrine. This answer has been alluded to already, but it is worth 
setting out at length because this result was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. 
The cases addressing vagueness best illustrate the choice faced 
by the Court. The battle between the Court’s members centered on 
the question of whether vagueness doctrine should be ratcheted up in 
stringency, or ratcheted down, in response to the new sorts of laws 
being enacted in the New Deal period. One side took the view that 
the novelty of the New Deal’s legislative program made it incumbent 
on the Court to police legislative drafting with extra vigilance to 
prevent unfair surprise to regulated parties. The other took the view 
that the degree of clarity or ambiguity in legislative drafting was itself 
a choice that the legislature has the prerogative to make and to which 
the Court must defer. Indeed, some members of the Court regarded 
the argument for legislative deference as so forceful that they 
believed it ought to apply even in the context of First Amendment 
vagueness challenges. 
An elaboration of the first of these contrasting visions is the 
dissent in Petrillo, a case in which the Court rejected a vagueness 
challenge to a provision of the Communications Act of 1934233 that 
made it unlawful to use or threaten force to coerce licensees to hire 
more employees than “needed by such licensee to perform actual 
services.”234 The defendant contended that there was no way to know 
how many employees were “needed” for a given job.235 Although 
admitting that “[c]learer and more precise language might have been 
framed by Congress to express what it meant by ‘number of 
employees needed,’” the Court noted that “none occurs to us, nor has 
any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out what 
appears to have been the Congressional purpose.”236 The Petrillo 
dissent complained that the statute was part and parcel of a novel 
 
 233. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 234. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 3 (1947) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 506 (repealed 1980)) 
(quotation marks omitted).  
 235. Id. at 7. 
 236. Id. 
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legislative program that required stronger judicial enforcement of 
vagueness: the act was 
one of the many regulatory acts that legislative bodies have passed 
in recent years to make unlawful certain practices in the field of 
economics that seemed contrary to the public interest. These 
statutes made new crimes. . . . Common experience has not created a 
general understanding of their criminality. Consequently, . . . a more 
precise definition of the crime is necessary.237 
In sum, the Petrillo dissent argued that the novelty of New Deal 
statutory law required the Court to adopt a more vigilant stance 
toward policing legislative draftsmanship to shield the rights to notice 
of individuals newly regulated by these laws.238 
The second of these contrasting visions is most comprehensively 
elaborated in Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Winters v. New York,239 a 
First Amendment vagueness case.240 In Winters, the Court struck 
down as vague a New York statute that prohibited dissemination of 
obscene materials.241 Justice Frankfurter’s dissent complained that the 
Court was using vagueness as a ruse to supersede New York’s valid 
policy choices: 
The painful experience which resulted from confusing economic 
dogmas with constitutional edicts ought not to be repeated by 
finding constitutional barriers to a State’s policy regarding 
crime . . . . This Court is not ready, I assume, to pronounce on 
causative factors of mental disturbance and their relation to crime. 
Without formally professing to do so, it may actually do so by 
 
 237. Id. at 16–17 & n.1 (Reed, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citing such measures as the 
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
151–169 (2006)), the FLSA, and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 25, 56 Stat. 33 
(codified as amended at U.S.C. app. §§ 901–946 (Supp. V 1946))).  
 238. Id.; see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 634 (1954) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“Whoever kidnaps, steals, kills, or commits similar acts of violence upon another is bound to 
know that he is inviting retribution by society, and many of the statutes which define these long-
established crimes are traditionally and perhaps necessarily vague. But we are dealing with a 
novel offense that has no established bounds and no such normal basis. The criminality of the 
conduct dealt with here depends entirely upon a purpose to influence legislation. . . . [I]t is an 
area where legal penalties should be applied only by formulae as precise and clear as our 
language will permit.”).  
 239. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
 240. Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 241. Id. at 519 (majority opinion). 
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invalidating legislation dealing with these problems as too 
“indefinite.”242 
On the dissent’s view, legislative judgment on the clarity or 
specificity of language “involves an exercise of judgment which is at 
the heart of the legislative process.”243 The vagueness challenge 
amounted to a request for the Court to “declare void the law which 
expresses the balance so struck by the legislature, on the ground that 
the legislature has not expressed its policy clearly enough.”244 Evoking 
the specter of Lochner, he admonished against “subtly supplant[ing]” 
legislative judgment with judicial judgment.245 
In the rule-of-lenity area, United States v. Dotterweich246 offers a 
parallel example of these contrasting visions. Dotterweich was a case 
addressing the liability of corporate executives for regulatory offenses 
committed by the corporations for which they worked.247 The Court’s 
opinion was suffused with references to the need for courts to read 
the statute in light of the policy ends sought to be achieved by 
Congress, rather than in light of the rule of lenity: 
The purposes of [the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act248] thus 
touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the 
circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-
protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of 
the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of 
government and not merely as a collection of English words.249 
The dissent objected strenuously to this approach, contending 
that the rule of lenity forbade reading the statute to extend liability to 
 
 242. Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 243. Id. at 533. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 537. 
 246. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 247. See Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability 
Offenses—A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REV. 463, 463 (1981). 
Dotterweich is frequently credited as the font of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine, a 
theory of criminal liability that has caused much scholarly debate, in particular because modern 
federal and state environmental statutes have incorporated this theory in their provisions for 
criminal liability. See Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1264 (2006).  
 248. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 653, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 301–392 (1940)). 
 249. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.  
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the corporate officer. In the dissent’s view, deference to legislative 
judgment instead required dismissing the indictment.250  
With respect to one facet of retroactivity doctrine, the Chenery 
cases lucidly illustrate the same tug-of-war over the proper 
implementation of deference.251 The Chenery lawsuits arose from a 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) order concerning the 
approval of a reorganization plan for a public utilities company.252 In 
the course of deciding whether to approve the reorganization plan 
proposed by the Chenerys for one such firm, the agency announced a 
new rule applicable to such reorganizations: that officers and 
directors of the company could not engage in stock purchases while 
the reorganization was pending.253 After remanding once for the 
agency to state adequate grounds for its determination,254 the 
Supreme Court sustained the SEC’s order in the subsequent appeal.255 
In this second decision, Chenery II, the question of retroactivity was 
squarely posed: the agency had created and applied a new rule of law 
in the course of adjudicating the Chenery case, and the challengers 
contended that this maneuver exceeded the agency’s authority.256 
The Chenery II majority disagreed and sustained the order.257 
The Court based its holding nearly entirely on considerations of 
administrative “experience” and deference to “informed, expert 
judgment.”258 To the majority, “the argument of retroactivity” 
amounted to “nothing more than a claim that the [agency] lacks 
power to enforce the standards of the Act in this proceeding”259—a 
claim that could not prevail. On the majority’s view, the Court was 
obliged to refrain from “stultify[ing] the administrative process” by 
 
 250. See id. at 292–93 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Reliance on the legislature to define crimes 
and criminals distinguishes our form of jurisprudence from certain less desirable ones.”).  
 251. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery II); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 
U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I). I am indebted to Ron Levin for this insight. 
 252. See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81–82. 
 253. Id. at 84–85. 
 254. Id. at 94–95 (“The Commission’s action cannot be upheld merely because findings 
might have been made and considerations disclosed which would justify its order as an 
appropriate safeguard for the interests protected by the Act. There must be such a responsible 
finding.”).  
 255. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 209. 
 256. Id. at 199–200.  
 257. Id. at 200. 
 258. Id. at 199, 207. 
 259. Id. at 203–04. 
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imposing a “rigid requirement” that an agency formulate new 
standards of conduct prospectively, by rule.260 
This result provoked an outraged dissent from Justice Jackson, 
who was joined by Justice Frankfurter.261 Unmoved by the majority’s 
repeated appeals to administrative deference,262 the dissent excoriated 
the Court for adopting the position that “[t]he Commission must be 
sustained because of its accumulated experience in solving a problem 
with which it had never before been confronted!”263 The argument for 
deference, the dissent wrote, can properly apply only where an 
agency is exercising discretion “under and within the law” and 
“cannot be invoked to support action outside of the law.”264 Asserting 
that the majority was condoning retroactive lawmaking,265 the dissent 
concluded by accusing the Court of approving “administrative 
authoritarianism,” or the “power to decide without law”—a result 
that “undervalue[d] and . . . belittle[d] the place of law, even in the 
system of administrative justice.”266 
As these judicial contests reflect, a struggle over how to 
implement the philosophy of judicial deference was being waged in 
the cases that drove the doctrinal evolution of due process notice 
during this era. The ethos that ultimately carried the day treats 
matters of notice as inherently political and treats judicial policing of 
 
 260. Id. at 202–03 (“[T]he agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-
case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. . . . And the choice made between 
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the 
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
 261. Id. at 213 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 262. See id. at 212–13 (“[W]e peruse the Court’s opinion diligently to find on what grounds 
it is now held that the Court of Appeals, on pain of being reversed for error, was required to 
stamp this order with its approval. We find but one. That is the principle of judicial deference to 
administrative experience. That argument is five times stressed in as many different 
contexts . . . .”). 
 263. Id. at 213. 
 264. Id. at 215. To excuse an agency from the obligation to have an existing rule of law to 
support its order, the dissent complained, would render futile the process of judicial review. See 
id. at 214 (“If it is of no consequence that no rule of law be existent to support an administrative 
order, and the Court of Appeals is obliged to defer to administrative experience and to sustain a 
Commission’s power merely because it has been asserted and exercised, of what use is it to print 
a record or briefs in the case, or to hear argument? Administrative experience always is present, 
at least to the degree that it is here, and would always dictate a like deference by this Court to 
an assertion of administrative power.”). 
 265. See id. at 213 (“Of course, thus to uphold the Commission by professing to find that it 
has enunciated a ‘new standard of conduct’ brings the Court squarely against the invalidity of 
retroactive law-making. But the Court does not falter.” (quoting id. at 203 (majority opinion)). 
 266. Id. at 216–17. 
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matters of notice as undemocratic judicial intrusion. An analogy can 
be drawn to Professor Cass Sunstein’s oft-repeated (though sharply 
contested267) claim that a central insight of the New Deal Court was its 
recognition that common-law rights were not naturally determined, 
but were instead a result of legislative preferences.268 Just as the Court 
came to regard allocations of rights as inherently matters of legislative 
choice rather than prepolitical entitlements, so did it come to 
embrace the view that legislative and regulatory clarity and 
prospectivity are inherently matters of legislative or administrative 
choice rather than abstract values that courts can reliably police in a 
vacuum. Under this “rational-basis style” review,269 the degree of 
clarity or prospectivity of legislation and regulation was a matter 
appropriately left to legislative and administrative discretion, just as 
substantive policy choices in economic matters were to be left to 
legislative and administrative discretion—and judicial interference on 
either score was equally illegitimate. 
Much has turned on the outcome of this contest. The most 
important consequence of the winners’ approach has been its 
significant but underappreciated influence on the mechanics of 
lawmaking. Because the Constitution requires bicameralism and 
presentment,270 enacting federal legislation is a resource-intensive 
affair. The bicameralism and presentment requirements “make it 
more difficult for factions to usurp legislative authority.”271 They 
“promote caution and deliberation[] by mandating that each piece of 
legislation clear an intricate process involving distinct constitutional 
 
 267. See David Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22–26 (2003) 
(criticizing Sunstein’s conclusions).  
 268. See Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (arguing that 
in the Lochner era “[m]arket ordering under the common law was understood to be a part of 
nature rather than a legal construct”); id. at 903 (“But Lochner was wrongly decided, and one of 
the reasons that it was wrong is that it depended on baselines and consequent understandings of 
action and neutrality that were inappropriate for constitutional analysis. The New Deal to a 
large degree rejected those understandings . . . .”). 
 269. The seminal cases on rational-basis review and equal protection handed down in the 
same period held that legislative solutions to economic problems were constitutionally valid, 
even if they were partial and imperfect. See, e.g., Ry. Exp. Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 
110 (1949) (“The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own 
wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of 
the advertising which they use. . . . It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the 
same genus be eradicated or none at all.”). 
 270. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 271. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 708 
(1997). 
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actors.”272 And, finally, they encourage “conflict and friction, 
enhancing the prospects for a full and open discussion of matters of 
public import.”273 These dynamics were intentional; the Founders 
deliberately “raise[d] the decision costs associated with lawmaking, 
safeguarding liberty through a deliberate sacrifice of governmental 
efficiency.”274  
In this calculus, stringent due process notice requirements 
operate to raise the costs of enacting legislation by requiring 
congressional lawmakers and the president to reach agreement on 
more precise legislative terms. For the same reason that rules are 
costlier to enact than standards,275 precise laws are costlier to enact 
than vague laws. Professor Sunstein has made an overlapping point 
about nondelegation doctrine: “Simply by virtue of requiring 
legislators to agree on a relatively specific form of words, the 
nondelegation principle seems to raise the burdens and costs 
associated with the enactment of federal law.”276 Stringent 
requirements of clarity and specificity thus act as an across-the-board 
check on all legislative activity. Conversely, loosening the 
requirement of legislative specificity—as the Court did through its 
due process notice jurisprudence—has the opposite effect: it 
facilitates the exercise of legislative power by enabling the passage of 
more statutes as well as the passage of statutes that are more vaguely 
worded.277 
 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. at 709. 
 274. Id. at 709–10; see also id. at 710 (quoting Madison’s view that “‘the facility and excess of 
law-making’ and not the converse, ‘seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most 
liable’” and Hamilton’s view that “[t]he injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few 
good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones” 
(alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961); and id. NO. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 275. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
562–63 (1992) (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than standards because rules involve 
advance determinations of the law’s content, whereas standards are more costly for legal 
advisors to predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later 
determinations of the law’s content.”).  
 276. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 320.  
 277. Cf. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We face 
a Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of laws in general, and of criminal laws in 
particular. It should be no surprise that as the volume increases, so do the number of imprecise 
laws. And no surprise that our indulgence of imprecisions that violate the Constitution 
encourages imprecisions that violate the Constitution. Fuzzy, leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-
by-the-courts legislation is attractive to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a 
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This is a distinct, and hitherto unacknowledged, means by which 
the Court in the New Deal era secured and enhanced legislative and 
executive power generally and federal power in particular. The New 
Deal reformulation of due process is thus not only a tale about how 
the Court retooled its attitude toward the rule-of-law values of 
statutory clarity and prospectivity. Rather, it is also a tale about how 
the Court’s jurisprudence greased the gears of legislative compromise 
and made it easier to enact laws of almost any variety, thereby giving 
a diffuse boost to the project of building the modern regulatory state. 
The New Deal constitutionalism of due process notice renders visible 
a Court coming to embrace, and indeed manipulate, the principle that 
methods of policing language are methods of allocating political 
power among the branches. Understanding this dynamic is 
worthwhile in its own right; it is also helpful because—as the next 
Part will address—it contextualizes doctrinal disturbances that are 
presently in progress. 
IV.  THE BUFFER’S DURABILITY 
Seventy-five years on, the New Deal is still very much a ripe 
source of controversy.278 The Supreme Court’s decision in June 2012 
on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act279 is just the latest and most pointed reminder that core aspects of 
the New Deal “settlement” are today vulnerable.280 
In all this ferment and flux, one can start with a basic question: 
What stature does the New Deal reformulation of due process notice 
have? In Professor Bruce Ackerman’s provocative but convenient 
terminology, did the New Deal constitutional “amendment” 
 
national problem but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nitty-
gritty. In the field of criminal law, at least, it is time to call a halt.”).  
 278. For some prominent and contrasting assessments, see, for example, 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 279 (1998); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional 
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 459 (1989); Richard Epstein, The Mistakes of 
1937, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 5 (1988); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994); and Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text 
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1299 (1995). 
 279. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (amended). 
 280. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (stating that the minimum-
coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act violated the Commerce 
Clause but could be sustained as a tax, and invalidating the conditional expansion of Medicare 
as impermissibly coercive under the Spending Clause).  
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encompass the law of due process notice?281 What would it mean to 
say that such an amendment occurred, when its occurrence went 
unheralded by contemporaneous observers and unremarked in 
popular commentary?282 Should these changes have the same 
indefinite doctrinal shelf life that (until recently) one has assumed 
that the other changes to constitutional doctrine made in this period 
will enjoy? 
One cannot grapple with these questions without coming to 
terms with the possibility that these changes in due process 
jurisprudence were a kind of a jurisprudential accident. A grand 
social experiment—the administrative state—was incubating, and the 
newly arrived Justices were inclined to shield it. The Justices were 
under pressure to restore the institutional legitimacy of judicial 
review from allegations of lingering Lochnerism. In short, the Court 
in this era was bending over backward to accommodate legislative 
judgment. The sense is hard to avoid that in some respects the Court 
may have bent a bit further than was strictly necessary. The New Deal 
reformulation of due process notice jurisprudence might simply have 
been a kind of overcorrection of constitutional course. 
Once a pendulum swings too far in one direction, it swings back. 
The plausibility of the overcorrection account is buttressed by current 
judicial contests over the boundaries of due process notice and over 
the appropriate role of federal courts in shielding notice values from 
impermissible exertions of legislative and executive power. 
In criminal law, the rule of lenity has shown some recent signs of 
vitality after its extended period of quiescence.283 On vagueness, a new 
and prominent example is Skilling v. United States.284 Skilling 
 
 281. See ACKERMAN, supra note 278.  
 282. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 254 n.23 (“The idea of a constitutional moment should, I 
think, be seen as a metaphor, connoting large-scale change spurred by popular wishes, rather 
than as a genuine constitutional amendment.”).  
 283. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion) (applying the 
rule of lenity to construe the term “proceeds” in the federal money-laundering statute to cover 
“profits,” not “gross receipts”); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 276, 475–76 (2008) (“Many modern judges and scholars either write off lenity as a 
dormant doctrine or theorize that its scope has gradually condensed to preventing only the 
criminalization of innocent conduct. Last Term, in United States v. Santos, [128 S. Ct. 2020 
(2008),] the Supreme Court began reversing that trend. . . . By turning to lenity as its first point 
of analysis and strictly construing a statutory term whose broader construction could only have 
added additional penalties to a preexisting conviction, the Court began reversing the 
contraction of lenity and revitalizing a crucial protection for defendants.”).  
 284. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
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concerned the federal “honest services” statute, which expressly 
stated that the mail and wire fraud statutes prohibited efforts to 
deprive others of “the intangible right of honest services.”285 For 
decades, as hundreds of federal prosecutions proceeded under this 
provision, “the criminal defense bar, some academics, and some 
federal judges (who remained dissenters only) complained that the 
new statute did not provide constitutionally sufficient notice of what 
conduct it criminalized and that it criminalized nonblameworthy 
behavior.”286 After repeatedly denying certiorari on this question,287 
the Court agreed to hear Skilling’s appeal in 2009.288 In a decision that 
greatly narrowed the statute’s scope, the Court held that the law had 
to be construed to prohibit only bribery and kickback schemes to 
avoid vagueness problems.289 In addition, “the majority went so far as 
taking the extraordinary step of warning Congress in a footnote that 
any effort to expand the mail fraud statute further would have to 
navigate through perilous constitutional shoals”290—the shoals of 
vagueness.291 The dissent, meanwhile, argued for striking the statute 
entirely, also on vagueness grounds.292 All nine Justices, then, agreed 
that this federal criminal statute was too vague to be enforced as it 
was written.293  
 
 285. Id. at 2907; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).  
 286. Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 34 
(2011). 
 287. See, e.g., United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1308 (2009). 
 288. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 393 (2009). 
 289. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907 (“Construing the honest services statute to extend beyond 
that core meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal. We therefore hold that 
§ 1346 covers only bribery and kickback schemes.”). 
 290. Buell, supra note 286, at 36. 
 291. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933 n.44 (“If Congress were to take up the enterprise of 
criminalizing ‘undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private employee,’ it would have to 
employ standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due process concerns.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States at 43, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (No. 08-
1394), 2010 WL 302206, at *43)); supra note 289. 
 292. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 293. The vagueness debate between the majority and the dissent in Skilling is a pure rehash 
of the debates that occurred during the New Deal period on how best to accommodate 
vagueness doctrine with deference to the legislature’s choices. The Skilling majority channeled 
the attitude of Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), by asserting that its narrow construction of the statute preserved 
the legislative prerogative: “[T]he Court does not legislate, but instead respects the legislature, by 
preserving a statute through a limiting interpretation.” Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 n.43 (majority 
opinion). The Skilling dissent, echoing the Dotterweich dissent, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 
U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting), contended that true deference to legislative 
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Due process notice concerns have also played a noteworthy role 
in recent cases implicating civil laws. In two cases decided in 2012, 
both concerning administrative agencies, the Court has taken care to 
stress the importance of notice. In the first, addressing the degree of 
deference due to the Department of Labor in interpreting its rules, 
the Court declined to extend Auer deference294 to that agency largely 
because of considerations of “unfair surprise” to regulated parties.295 
The Court’s reasoning appears to make fair notice to regulated 
parties a prerequisite for the extension of Auer deference to agency 
interpretations of regulations.296 In the second case, which addressed 
the Federal Communications Commission’s shifting efforts to 
regulate indecency on television broadcasts, the Court stressed that 
notice problems would be created by “regulatory change this abrupt 
on any subject,” en route to holding that such change “surely” posed 
a notice problem where protected speech might be chilled.297 Other 
 
judgment would require holding the statute vague: “The Court strikes a pose of judicial 
humility . . . . [But] it is wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal 
crimes.” Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has long been a vocal 
advocate for placing some teeth back into the vagueness doctrine. See, e.g., Sykes v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising Congress for enacting an 
“ever-increasing volume” of “imprecise laws”); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255–
56 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (inviting a vagueness challenge to the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1988)).  
 294. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (holding that an agency’s interpretation 
of an ambiguous regulation merits deference even when the interpretation is offered in a legal 
brief, so long as it reflects the “agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in 
question”).  
 295. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167–68 (2012) (“[T]he 
pharmaceutical industry had little reason to suspect that its longstanding practice of treating 
detailers as exempt outside salesmen transgressed the FLSA. The statute and regulations 
certainly do not provide clear notice of this. . . . [W]here, as here, an agency’s announcement of 
its interpretation is preceded by a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction, the potential for 
unfair surprise is acute.”). See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole 
Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1461–62 (2011) (noting the potential dangers of 
deference to agencies that promulgate their own rules and interpret them with few safeguards). 
 296. See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167 (holding that deference to the agency’s 
interpretation “would seriously undermine the principle that agencies should provide regulated 
parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires’”) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHA, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).  
 297. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2318 (2012) (emphasis added) 
(“The Commission’s lack of notice to Fox and ABC that its interpretation had 
changed . . . ‘fail[ed] to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited.’ This would be true with respect to a regulatory change this abrupt on any subject, 
but it is surely the case when applied to the regulations in question, regulations that touch upon 
‘sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms’ . . . .”) (second alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008); and Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964))).  
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recent cases, such as Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & 
Ulrich LPA,298 likewise show the Justices debating the extent to which 
notice values require protection from complex federal civil 
regulations.299 
Now, a cynic might take the view, à la the mid-1930s critics of 
judicial mistrust of legislatures noted in Part II,300 that these 
contemporary invocations of due process notice values are merely 
driven by politics or ideology rather than by any deep-seated concern 
over constitutional values. Certainly, at least some of the recent 
opinions that most aggressively urge the importance of protecting 
notice—for example, the dissents in Skilling and Jerman—were not 
penned by jurists greatly enamored of the laws and regulations under 
review in those cases. Prominent scholars have mapped how the 
Court can use statutory construction and canons of interpretation to 
manipulate substantive outcomes.301 It would be easy to dismiss these 
opinions as mere cumulative evidence of the fact that constitutional 
doctrines, particularly interpretive rules, are malleable instruments 
that conservative courts can wield to curb disliked exercises of 
regulatory power. 
That view is certainly plausible. But it too sharply discounts the 
demonstrable appeal across the ideological spectrum of the various 
 
 298. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010). 
 299. The dissent in Jerman urged reading a “mistake[] of law” defense into a provision 
authorizing a defense to civil suits under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1962–1692p (2006), where the conduct violative of the act was the result of a “bona 
fide error,” Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1629–30 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Citing the quantity and 
complexity of federal consumer-protection legislation, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, 
argued that individuals who acted on good-faith interpretations of what the law required ought 
not to be vulnerable to civil liability for their “technical violations.” Id. at 1631. This is an 
argument that the rationale of the Murdock line of cases should be expanded to apply to the 
context of civil liability. See id. at 1630 (“The FDCPA is but one of many federal laws that 
Congress has enacted to protect consumers.”); id. (collecting statutes); id. at 1632 (citing “the 
complexity of the FDCPA regime” and its implementing regulations); cf. United States v. 
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (exempting from liability those who fail to pay taxes because 
of a good-faith misunderstanding of complex tax rules); see supra text accompanying notes 131–
135. 
 300. See supra notes 58, 198–201. 
 301. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1509, 1512 n.9, 1542–47 (1998) (describing the “manipulable” nature of linguistic and text-based 
canons); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 433 (2002) (“Through equitable doctrines, interpretive 
canons, and other devices of statutory construction, the [Rehnquist] Court has conferred 
protections [upon state and local governments] that would be difficult if not impossible to derive 
directly from the Constitution.”).  
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facets of due process notice doctrine. Consider, for example, the rule 
of lenity. As described in Part II.C, the rule of lenity was formerly 
decried as a proxy variable reflecting latent conservative judicial 
hostility toward progressive legislation—as a tool for undercutting 
positive law from the same toolbox as the rule that statutes in 
derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed.302 But 
today, no single antiregulatory political agenda appears to unite the 
Justices who are inclined to reinvigorate judicial enforcement of the 
rule of lenity.303 Of course, not everyone supports the rule of lenity,304 
but it would be odd to accuse those who do advocate its more 
aggressive use of being closet Lochnerists. 
A somewhat similar tale can be told about retroactivity. Though 
historically a doctrine intimately linked to the idea of protection of 
traditional property rights, retroactivity challenges now often emerge 
in challenges to statutory and regulatory schemes that have nothing to 
do with property rights—notably, in the immigration context.305 In 
these cases, the liberal members of the Court, not just the 
conservatives, have employed retroactivity doctrine—albeit only to 
construe a statute as prospective, not to void it for impermissible 
retroactivity.306 The point is only that, as with lenity, a doctrine that 
was once reliably associated with a single political or ideological 
valence in one context (the regulation of economic matters) attracts a 
quite different set of supporters in another (the regulation of 
 
 302. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 303. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 513–14 (2008) (Scalia, Souter, Thomas 
& Ginsburg, JJ.) (applying the rule of lenity to the federal money-laundering statute); id. at 524, 
528 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (providing a different rationale for applying the 
rule of lenity); see also Price, supra note 192, at 886 (explaining the two main rationales for 
lenity, notice and legislative supremacy, and their flaws); The New Rule of Lenity, supra note 34, 
at 2420 (analyzing the Rehnquist Court’s modified application of the rule of lenity).  
 304. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198–200 (1985) (finding that the rule of lenity is only used now to 
provide outcomes that “seem right”); Kahan, supra note 191, at 396–425 (arguing against lenity 
and the notion lenity should be prioritized over other means of interpretation).  
 305. See, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483 (2012) (deciding whether the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 18 U.S.C.), is 
applicable to a crime that occurred before the law became effective); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289, 292–93 (2001) (inquiring whether the IIRIRA was intended to apply retroactively to past 
crimes). 
 306. Compare, e.g., Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1484 (Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.) (applying the presumption against retroactivity and construing the 
statute to have prospective effect only), with id. at 1492 (Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.) (arguing 
that the statute was not retroactive). 
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immigration and deportation). In short, the jurisprudence of due 
process notice interacts in somewhat unpredictable ways with 
ideology; notice, like politics, makes strange bedfellows.307 
Understanding this point might encourage one to approach 
recent cases in which the Court has played with due process notice 
with a less skeptical stance. Here is one possible take on these cases—
an angle that is a bit more charitable and perhaps also more 
illuminating. The opinions just described emphasize the importance 
of due process notice, but they also share another feature in common: 
these cases involve confusing federal statutes and complex federal 
regulatory schemes. A persistent element of current legal and policy 
debate is the critique of federal “hyperlexis,” or the complaint that 
there exist too many federal laws and regulations, both civil and 
criminal.308 Not too difficult to perceive in these recent cases is a more 
fundamental and genuine strain of resistance to the statutory and 
regulatory complexity that characterizes federal law today, as well as 
a degree of sympathy with the regulated individual who, in plowing a 
path through the legal thicket, unwittingly crosses some forbidden 
line. Vagueness, retroactivity, and lenity offer a tempting array of 
tools for curbing the modern-day bêtes noirs of federal 
“overregulation” or “overcriminalization.” Put differently, in today’s 
mature administrative state, emphasis on due process notice is not so 
much a reliable stalking horse for conservative ideology, but rather 
for a more widely shared concern that courts have made too sharp a 
retreat from policing constitutional constraints on various kinds of 
legislative and executive action affecting individuals and businesses. 
Whatever one’s views on the judicial motives behind these 
opinions, however, the recent rumblings around due process notice 
may be safely read to reflect pressure building against the New Deal 
reformulation of due process notice doctrine. These cases increase the 
odds that the New Deal reformulation of due process notice doctrine 
was not a fundamental part of what the New Deal “settled,” or settled 
permanently. They also pose a normative question that merits a 
 
 307. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64 
(2012) (“Across a broad range of cases, the Court expressed a suspicion of the political 
process—a suspicion that goes beyond skepticism toward the traditional Carolene Products 
categories . . . . And while the distrust was expressed more often by the more conservative 
members of the Court, it was not limited to them.”).  
 308. See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1587 
(2012) (describing variants of “the claim that America suffers from ‘hyperlexis,’ or the existence 
of ‘too much law,’” and its influence on governmental actors).  
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response: Is the New Deal reformulation of due process notice 
doctrine maladapted to the modern regulatory state? 
Certainly, reasons for rethinking the lines drawn by the New 
Deal reformulation of due process notice jurisprudence are not hard 
to adduce. Statutes and regulations are far more extensive now than 
they were in that era,309 and they probably affect the behavior of 
individuals as well as businesses to a greater extent now.310 Businesses, 
much less individuals, are often unable to consult with regulators to 
determine in advance how the law may apply to them.311 Civil 
regulations often impose consequences that are as severe in some 
respects as criminal sanctions,312 a fact that undermines somewhat the 
rationale for differential scrutiny of these categories for vagueness 
purposes. The existence of mens rea requirements has not saved 
individuals from criminal convictions for conduct that it would be 
hard to suspect was civilly sanctioned, let alone criminally 
punishable.313 A prima facie case can easily be made, then, that the 
 
 309. APA at 65: Is Reform Needed To Create Jobs, Promote Economic Growth, and Reduce 
Costs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial, & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12 fig.2 (2011) (statement of Susan Dudley, Director, George 
Washington University Regulatory Studies Center) (describing the increase in the number of 
pages in the Federal Register from 1940 to 2010); Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will 
the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 101, 105 (2000) (“In 1928, the unannotated version of the United States Code appeared in 
two tall volumes that totaled six inches in width. The 1988 version of the unannotated Code 
included twenty-nine volumes that spanned six feet, a twelve-fold increase.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 310. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 409 (1989) (describing the continuing post-New Deal growth of the regulatory state during 
the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, when the “national government substantially 
increased its regulatory responsibilities”). 
 311. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1628, 
1635 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the notion that “an attorney faced with legal 
uncertainty only needs to turn to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for an advisory 
opinion” as “misconceiv[ing] the practical realities of litigation” and concluding that this may 
partly account for “why, in the past decade, the FTC has issued only four opinions in response 
to just seven requests”).  
 312. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1534 (1996) (“[S]ome justification for corporate criminal liability may have 
existed in the past, when civil enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a 
deterrence perspective, very little now supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than 
civil liability on corporations. Indeed, the answer to the question the title poses—‘corporate 
criminal liability: what purpose does it serve?’—is ‘almost none.’”). 
 313. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring) (“This case is novel: The Government has obtained a false statements conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 against an individual who signed the wrong name on a postal delivery 
form.”). 
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due process notice doctrine crafted in the New Deal era is 
maladapted to the shape and operation of the mature regulatory 
state. 
When a system’s premises “cease[] to be persuasive descriptive 
accounts of the world,” it is time to “reassess and revise those 
premises.”314 It lies beyond the scope of this Article to perform a 
normative assessment of whether and how due process notice 
doctrine requires renovation in view of the statutory and regulatory 
complexity of modern-day American law. But without understanding 
the due process notice doctrine of the past, it is impossible to sketch 
the due process notice doctrine that society may want and need for 
the future. This Article has laid some necessary groundwork for that 
normative analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
John Pierpont Morgan is generally known as a financier, not a 
legal philosopher. He lived his life during the ascendancy of Lochner, 
at the zenith of the doctrine of liberty of contract.315 And Morgan was 
speaking of people, not of courts, when he observed that a man 
generally has two reasons for doing something: a good reason and the 
real reason.316 Still, it is hard to formulate a pithier summary of legal 
realism’s view of how courts reason.317 
The story of due process notice doctrine vividly illustrates how 
effectively good reasons can mask real reasons. The shifts in due 
process notice doctrine described in this Article mostly occurred with 
little fanfare, in the course of the Court’s adjudication of 
constitutional and statutory cases across a wide and variegated legal 
terrain. The Court routinely packaged its reasons for rejecting a 
notice challenge, or for altering its interpretive techniques relevant to 
notice, as just an unobjectionable application of past precedents to 
new facts. 
With a little digging, however, it becomes evident that during this 
period the Court was engaged in refashioning due process notice 
 
 314. Cushman, supra note 227, at 258. 
 315. See JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER, at ix (2000) (“When Pierpont 
Morgan died in 1913 . . . he was the most powerful banker in the world.”).  
 316. Id. at xiii. 
 317. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 
(1931) (describing legal realism as involving “distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive 
rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions”). 
SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013  12:13 PM 
1226 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1169 
doctrine to allow a wide judicial berth to the regulatory state. In this 
newly emerging constitutional regime, aggressive judicial review of 
matters of notice came to seem as unwelcome and as abnormal as 
aggressive judicial review of substantive policy questions. Hidden in 
plain view, the New Deal constitutionalism of due process notice 
encapsulates how the Court adapted the demands of rule-of-law 
values and the institution of judicial review to the changing 
constitutional and political convictions of American society.318 
Thus reformulated, due process notice doctrine served an 
important purpose. Within the relaxed constraints of due process 
notice jurisprudence, Congress, state legislatures, and federal and 
state agencies have for seventy-five years wielded a largely free hand, 
at least from the standpoint of due process notice questions, in 
drafting the civil and criminal laws and regulations that would govern 
modern America in all its complexity. 
But this relaxation may have stretched the doctrine to the 
snapping point. When modern judges survey the resultant morass of 
federal laws and regulations, some now perceive a threat to the fragile 
virtues of constitutionally adequate notice. These judges have once 
again started to toy with the idea of using due process notice doctrine 
as a tool for restraining legislation and regulation. 
To be sure, judicial opinions invoking concepts of due process 
notice are few and far between. But, now and then, and perhaps with 
increasing assuredness, such opinions do come down. Though they 
make little splash, they strike the ear like the first few drops of a 
heavier rainfall. Before that rain starts in earnest, public law scholars 
must engage with the questions of whether and how due process 
notice doctrine should be adapted to respond to the demands of 
today’s regulatory state. 
 
 318. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law and culture are locked in a 
dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates 
culture”). 
